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American law has long embraced a fundamental distinction between the
public and private spheres. As a result, certain issues important to women,
including domestic violence and sexual assault, have traditionally been deemed
private and therefore exempt from legal scrutiny. Feminist scholars have
critiqued two versions of the dichotomy between public and private spheres that
have been particularly powerful in shaping the social and legal status of women:
the split between the market and the family and the split between the state and
civil society. By challenging these distinctions, feminists have sought to include
the issues of domestic violence and sexual assault on the nation's political and
legal agenda. Their efforts resulted in the passage of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which created a federal civil rights remedy for
victims ofgender-motivated violence. The enactment of VA WA occurred against
a backdrop ofvigorous opposition by federal and state judges, who objected that
it would bring "'private" matters into federal court. The passage of the
legislation seemed to signal the definitive arrival of violence against women in
the public sphere of law and politics.
However, a series of cases has challenged the constitutionality of VAWA's
civil rights provision. While most courts faced with the issue have upheld the
law's constitutionality, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in its en banc opinion in the case Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University, found that Congress lacked constitutional
authority to enact the civil rights remedy. That decision is currently under review
by the United States Supreme Court. The author argues that the Fourth Circuit's
opinion, which concluded that gender-based violence is too remote from both
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interstate commerce and state action to give Congress authority to act under the
Commerce Clause or Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, rests on an
unwarranted adherence to traditional notions ofprivacy that are damaging to
women.
While much of the debate over the constitutionality of VA WA 's civil rights
provision has been framed in terms of federalism, the author contends that
VAWA should also be examined in the context of the current controversy over
gender-specific concepts ofprivacy. She argues that violent sex discrimination is
not merely a personal, individual harm but is an injury to women as a group and
to society as a whole. She concludes that the Violence Against Women Act's
federal civil rights remedy for gender-motivated violence is both constitutionally
sound and a necessary component of legal protections guaranteeing sex
equality.
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[The Congress has found that crimes of violence motivated by gender constitute
bias crimes in violation of the victim's right to befreefrom discrimination on the
basis of gender,... existing bias and discrimination in the criminal justice
system often deprives victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender of equal
protection of the laws and the redress to which they are entitled; crimes of
violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate
commerce... ; a Federal civil rights action as specified in this section is
necessary to guarantee equal protection of the laws and to reduce the
substantial adverse effects on interstate commerce caused by crimes of violence
motivated by gender....
-United States Congress1
Such a statute, we are constrained to conclude, simply cannot be reconciled with
the principles of limited federal government upon which this Nation is
founded.... This the Congress may not do, even in pursuit of the most noble of
causes, lest be ceded to the Legislature a plenary power over every aspect of
human affairs-no matter how private .....
-United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, en bane2
I. INTRODUCTION
In the words of one feminist scholar, "[t]he dichotomy between the private
and the public is central to almost two centuries of feminist writing and struggle;
it is, ultimately, what the feminist movement is about."3 Since the inception of
the modem feminist movement and particularly during the past thirty years,
feminist scholars and advocates have waged a vigorous attack on traditional
notions of privacy.4 As exemplified by the slogan "the personal is political,"
feminism5 has sought to undermine conventional views that deem issues of
1 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994). These findings were part of the original
text of the Violence Against Women Act and were adopted by both houses of Congress. See
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949,967 n.10 (4th Cir. 1997),
vacated and reh'g en banc granted (Feb. 5, 1998), on reh 'g en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. grantedsub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
2 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 826, 889 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999) (striking
down the civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act as unconstitutional).
3 CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND POLmCAL
THEORY 118 (1989).
4 See Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private
Distinction, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 322 (1993) (describing critiques of privacy by
nineteenth century and late twentieth century feminists).
5 Feminists are not alone in challenging iraditional divisions between public and private.
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pressing concern to women-including household labor, sexuality, domestic
violence, and sexual harassment, to name just a few-to be private and therefore
beneath the notice of law and politics.6
Violence against women has been a particular focus of feminism's challenge
to traditional formulations of private and public. Much feminist scholarship and
activism has been devoted to demonstrating the central role played by male
violence in creating and preserving female subordination. 7 Feminists have also
extensively documented the ways in which long-accepted definitions of privacy
have operated to make violence against women legally and politically invisible.8
Specifically, feminist writers have identified and critiqued two dichotomies
between public and private that have strongly influenced legal thought: the
distinction between the market and the family, and the distinction between the
state and civil society.9 Both of these distinctions characterize violence against
women as belonging to the private sphere, removed from the realm of law and
politics. Feminists have called for resituating violence against women in the
public sphere in order to gain access to a full array of legal and political weapons
to combat it.10
A high-water mark for the feminist effort to bring violence against women
into the public arena was the passage of the federal Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA or the Act).1I Enacted in 1994 after four years of intensive lobbying
by women's rights groups and others,12 the Violence Against Women Act was
For example, the critical legal studies movement has made the public-private distinction a
target of criticism. See, e.g., David Kairys, Introduction to THE POLMcs OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRIQUE 1, 5 (David Kairys ed., 1990); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 286-89, 355-68 (1979); see generally
Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 1289 (1982). However, the
present discussion focuses on the distinctive feminist challenge to the public-private
distinction.
6 See, e.g., SUsAN MOLLER OKN, JUsTCE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 124 (1989) ('"The
personal is political' is the central message of feminist critiques of the public/domestic
dichotomy."); Olsen, supra note 4, at 322 ("An illustration of the [feminist movement's] focus
on the public/private distinction is the familiar slogan 'the personal is political.").
7 See infra Part Il.
See infra Part m].
9 See id.
10 See generally, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, in THE PUBLIC
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 36 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds.,
1994).
11 See generally Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1902 (1994).
12 On the legislative history of VAWA, see Sally Goldfarb, The Civil Rights Remedy of
the Violence Against Women Act: Legislative History, Policy Implications & Litigation
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the federal government's first attempt at a comprehensive response to the social
and legal problems posed by domestic violence, rape, and other forms of gender-
motivated violence. 13 The statute's seven subtitles contain dozens of provisions
designed to enhance legal remedies for violence against women; improve the
performance of police, prosecutors and the courts in domestic violence and rape
cases; provide protection and other resources for victims; and reduce the
incidence of violence against women.14 For example, the legislation makes it a
federal crime to commit domestic violence across state lines or to violate a
protection order across state lines; requires states to accord full faith and credit to
protection orders issued in other states; authorizes federal grants to increase the
effectiveness of police, prosecutors, judges, and victim services agencies in cases
of violent crime against women; provides funding for a national toll-free
domestic violence hotline; increases federal financial support for battered
women's shelters; reforms immigration law to protect battered immigrant
women; amends the Federal Rules of Evidence to extend rape shield protection
to civil as well as criminal cases; and calls for expanded research and record-
keeping on violence against women. 15
Most significantly, the Violence Against Women Act created a federal civil
right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender. 16 VAWA's civil
Strategy, A Panel Discussion, 4 J.L. & PoL'Y 391, 392-97 (1996); Victoria F. Nourse, Where
Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights
Remedy, 11 Wis. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1996).
13 Previous federal legislation directly addressing violence against women consisted of a
sparse patchwork of federal funding provisions and criminal law. See, e.g., White Slave Traffic
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1994); Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 10401-10415 (1994).
14 See generally Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 16, 18, 20, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
15 See generally id. Most of the provisions in the Violence Against Women Act refer
specifically to domestic violence or sexual assault (including rape). However, the civil rights
provision covers any crime of violence motivated by gender, as defined in the Act See infra
note 16.
16 See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, tit. IV (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981
(1994)). The civil rights provision reads in relevant part:
(b) All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of
violence motivated by gender....
(c) A person... who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender... shall be liable
to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages,
injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
(d) For purposes of this section-
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a crime of
violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at
least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender, and
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rights provision allows a victim of gender-motivated violence to bring a civil
lawsuit to redress the deprivation of her federal civil rights.17 The provision
permits awards of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and attorney's fees.18 By designating gender-motivated
violence as a federal civil rights violation, VAWA embraces the feminist
characterization of violence against women as a form of sex discrimination,
rather than merely a private, individual harm.
When VAWA was pending in Congress, the civil rights provision was its
most controversial aspect. 19 To attain its passage, supporters of the legislation
had to overcome opposition based on the longstanding attitude that violence
against women is a private matter, not a suitable subject for federal judicial
attention. During congressional deliberations on the Act, the controversy over the
civil rights provision focused in large part on whether federal courts should
concern themselves with violence committed by private individuals-
particularly when such violence takes place in the context of family
relationships. 20 The bill's opponents, including organizations representing the
federal and state judiciaries, advanced arguments that relied heavily on
traditional concepts of the split between the market and family and the split
between the state and civil society.21 In fact, one of the primary goals of
supporters of the Act was to overcome centuries of assumptions about the public
and private spheres that have operated to deny women full equality under the
(2) the term "crime of violence" means-
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the
person or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct
presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and that would come
within the meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of
title 18, United States Code, whether or not those acts have actually
resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction and whether or not
those acts were committed in the special maritime, territorial, or prison
jurisdiction of the United States; and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony
described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person
who takes such action and the individual against whom such action is
taken.
42 U.S.C. §§ 13981(b)-(d) (1994).
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
18 See id; 42 U.S.C. § 1988. For further discussion of the cause of action created by the
civil rights provision, see infra Part IV.C.
19 See infra Part IV.
20 See id.
21 See infra Part IV.B.
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law.22 Passage of VAWA seemed to signal a major victory for feminist efforts to
bring violence against women out from behind the veil of privacy.
However, the battle over the Violence Against Women Act did not end with
its enactment. In a series of court challenges, defendants have asserted that
VAWA's civil rights provision is unconstitutional.2 3 They have claimed that
Congress lacked authority to enact the provision under both the Commerce
Clause24 and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,2 5 which are the two
constitutional sources cited in the text of the legislation and supported by
extensive legislative history.26
The constitutional challenges to VAWA's civil rights remedy have received
a mixed response in the lower federal courts. The overwhelming majority of the
courts ruling on the question have held that the civil rights remedy was a
constitutionally pernissible exercise of Congress's legislative powers. 27
22 See infra Parts In, V.A.
23 The criminal provisions of VAWA, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261 and 2262 (1994),
have also been subject to constitutional challenges. With the exception of one federal district
court opinion that was later reversed on appeal, the criminal provisions have been consistently
upheld under the Commerce Clause. See generally, e.g., United States v. Gluzman, 154 F.3d
49 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1257 (1999); United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758
(4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 896 (1997); United States v. Wright, 965 F. Supp. 1307
(D. Neb.), rev'd, 128 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1053 (1998). The
criminal provisions require travel across state lines as an element of the offense, thereby
limiting federal jurisdiction to cases with a proven interstate nexus. This jurisdictional element
has enabled courts to transcend concerns about the "private" nature of violence against women.
See, e.g., United States v. Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 571 (5th Cir. 1999) ("The [criminal]
provision ... regulates the use of channels of interstate commerce .... As a result, that
violence against a spouse is a private or noncommercial activity is of no moment."). The civil
rights provision, which is the subject of this Article, contains no such jurisdictional element.
2 4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
25 US. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994).
27 See generally Williams v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, No. 98-2845-JTM, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13532 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1999); Kuhn v. Kuhn, 98-C-2395, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11010 (N.D. Ii. July 15, 1999); Wright v. Wright, No. Civ. 98-572-A (W.D. Olda. Apr. 27,
1999); Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Culberson v. Doan, 65
F. Supp. 2d 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass.), vacated and
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Doe v. Walker, 193 F3d 42 (1st Cir. 1999); Liu v.
Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Wash.
1998); Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, No. 98-1550-Civ-Highsmith (S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 1998);
C.R.K. v. Martin, No. 96-1431-MLB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22305 (D. Kan. July 10, 1998);
Timm v. DeLong, 59 F. Supp. 2d 944 (D. Neb. 1998); Mattison v. Click Corp. of Am., No. 97-
CV-2736, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 720 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998); Crisonino v. N.Y. City Hous.
Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill.
1997); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp.
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However, in an en bane decision in the case Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
Institute & State University, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit-the only court of appeals to rule on the issue to date-held that
Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact the civil rights provision.28 The
Supreme Court has agreed to review this decision.29
Taken at face value, the constitutional challenges to VAWA appear to be
concerned solely with discerning the proper dimensions of Congress's powers
under the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For
reasons that will be explained below, both the Commerce Clause and section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment provide Congress with ample authority to enact
VAWA's civil rights remedy.30 However, these cases are not exclusively about
questions of constitutional doctrine. Beneath the surface, another phenomenon is
at work. This Article will examine the connections between the constitutional
challenges to VAWA and the historical tendency to view violence against
women as intrinsically private and therefore undeserving of legal redress,
particularly in the federal courts.
The litigation concerning the constitutionality of VAWA's civil rights
remedy contains many instances of arguments based on longstanding, flawed
assumptions about privacy. The litigation thus echoes the privacy-based
arguments advanced by opponents of the legislation in their unsuccessful
attempts to defeat the Act in Congress. Just as federal and state judicial
organizations tried to persuade Congress not to pass VAWA because it would
bring private, family matters into federal court, the Fourth Circuit's Brzonkala
decision asserted that VAWA's civil rights provision would cover violence
within the family, that such violence lacks adequate connections to interstate
commerce and does not implicate state action, and that upholding the
constitutionality of VAWA would allow federal law to usurp the entire field of
domestic relations.31
Much of the legal struggle over VAWA's constitutionality has been framed
in terms of federalism.3 2 While the future of federalism is currently being
1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Doe,
929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996). But see Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. grantedsub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120
S. Ct. 11 (1999); Bergeron v. Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628 (M.D. La. 1999).
2 8 See generally Brzonkala, 169 F.3d 820.
29 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases of United States v.
Morrison (No. 99-5) and Brzonkala v. Morrison (No. 99-29) on September 28, 1999. As this
Article goes to press, a decision is expected by the end of the 1999-2000 term.
30 See infra Part V.
31 See generally Brzonkala, 169 F.3d 820; infra Part V.B.
3 2 See infra Part V.
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contested in a variety of contexts,33 and the VAWA cases are in one sense a
chapter in this larger story, it would be a mistake to see them as nothing more
than this. When the issue at hand is violence against women, the federalism
debate is interwoven with a debate over the continuing validity of traditional,
gender-specific concepts of privacy.34 The latter debate has a significant impact
on the reasoning and outcome of the VAWA cases.
The constitutional challenges to the civil rights provision threaten to re-
impose the rigid barrier between the public and private spheres that VAWA itself
was designed to transcend. This Article will argue that, contrary to the assertions
of some litigants and judges, finding that VAWA's civil rights remedy is
constitutional is not tantamount to erasing all meaningful distinctions between
the public and the private and between the roles of federal and state government
Instead, the civil rights remedy is grounded on a legitimate recognition that
violence against women-although it has historically been characterized as
private-has significant links to the public spheres of the market and the state.
Upholding the Violence Against Women Act does not require abandoning the
concept of privacy. It does require overcoming deeply ingrained, gender-specific
attitudes toward privacy that obscure the extent to which harms to women are
harms to society.
As background to this discussion, Part 11 of this Article will describe the
impact of violence on women's lives and the contributions of feminist theory to
an understanding of the role of violence in maintaining women's subordinate
status. Because gender-motivated violence is a form of sex discrimination, a
federal civil rights law to redress the resulting denial of equality is an appropriate
remedy.
Part II explores the ideologies underlying the traditional view that violence
against women is private and therefore beneath the notice of the law. This Part
33 See, e.g., Condon v. Reno, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,
120 S. Ct. 631 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. CL 2199 (1999); City of
Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United
States v. Jones, 178 F.3d 479 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. CL 494 (1999). Attention to
issues of federalism has been particularly pronounced in decisions of the Fourth Circuit. See
Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
1220 (2000) (describing "the recent intensity with which the Supreme Court and this circuit
have focused on issues of federalism, separation of powers, and a limited federal govemmene)
(citations omitted); Mark Hansen, Mid-Atlantic Drift, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 66, 67-68
(noting Fourth Circuit's reputation for conservatism on states' rights).
34 Indeed, as discussed below, certain arguments about federalism---specifically the
resistance to having federal courts hear claims involving women or families-are themselves
an outgrowth of gender-related ideas about privacy. See infra Part mAI.4.
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analyzes two dichotomies between public and private spheres that are deeply
embedded in American law: the dichotomy between the market and the family,
and the dichotomy between the state and civil society. In the years leading up to
introduction of the Violence Against Women Act, these two versions of the
public-private split worked in concert to render violence against women doubly
private and therefore largely immune from effective legal remedies. Because the
federal courts adhere particularly zealously to both versions of the public-private
distinction, it proved to be especially difficult to include violence against women
within the scope of federal civil rights guarantees.
Part IV will examine the continuing strength of traditional notions of public
and private as expressed in the rhetoric of supporters and opponents of the civil
rights provision while VAWA was pending in Congress. While the bill's
sponsors and those who testified in its support explicitly attacked the view that
domestic violence and other forms of violence against women are private and
therefore beyond the reach of federal civil rights law, the bill's opponents-
including federal and state judicial organizations-relied on arguments drawn
directly from the classic formulations of the public-private split. At the
conclusion of this debate, VAWA was enacted in 1994, creating a federal civil
right to be free from gender-motivated violence. This legislative victory marked
a major departure from the customary perception that violence against women is
a private matter.
Part V will turn to the constitutional challenges to VAWA. After
demonstrating that challenges to the civil rights provision under both the
Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment fail on their own
terms, I will trace the lineage of these challenges to age-old concepts of public
and private spheres. Specifically, the Commerce Clause challenge asserts that
violence against women is too remote from the public sphere of the market,
while the Fourteenth Amendment challenge asserts that violence against women
is too remote from the public sphere of the state. In short, the claim that
VAWA's civil rights remedy is unconstitutional relies heavily on the assumption
that violence against women is purely private under both versions of the public-
private dichotomy. This assumption overlooks the significant public aspects of
gender-motivated violence, including its effects on women's employment,
women's economic status, and interstate commerce generally; its relationship to
discriminatory state legal systems; and its impact on women's opportunities for
equal citizenship. These public aspects distinguish gender-motivated violence
from other activities that have been found to be outside the scope of the
legislative powers conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause and section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Violence Against Women Act's civil rights remedy was designed to
recognize and redress the public harm inflicted by a type of violence that has
2000]
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historically been considered private. It remains to be seen how the Supreme
Court will respond to the claim that the civil rights provision is unconstitutional.
It is clear from past events, however, that the conventional view of violence
against women as a purely private phenomenon has many adherents among the
judiciary. Properly understood, gender-motivated violence has both public and
private characteristics. It often arises within the family, but it affects the market.
It is usually committed by private actors, but it is facilitated by state action and
inaction, and it impairs the ability of women as a class to function as equal
citizens. These public aspects, which have for so long been overshadowed by the
emphasis on violence against women as a private injury, are in fact sufficient to
sustain congressional action under both the Commerce Clause and section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Only by recognizing that gender-motivated violence
straddles the familiar dichotomies between market and family, between the state
and civil society, and between public and private, can the Court properly weigh
the constitutional challenges to the Violence Against Women Act.
II. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
Violence is a pervasive and destructive force in the lives of women. Three to
four million American women are battered by a spouse or intimate partner each
year.35 Two to four thousand women die annually as a result of domestic
violence? 6 According to the Surgeon General, domestic violence is the single
largest cause of injury to women in the United States.37 Almost eighteen million
women--one-sixth of all women in this country-have been the victim of an
attempted or completed rape at some time during their lives; more than half of
these women were assaulted before the age of eighteen.3 8 Almost 900,000
attempted and completed rapes are perpetrated against adult women each year.39
Not only is crime against women widespread, but it also manifests a
dramatic gender imbalance. Rape, domestic violence, and stalking are far more
likely to claim women than men as victims.40 The rate of assault for young
3 5 See S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 30 (1990) (citation omitted).
3 6 See id. at 36 (citation omitted).
37 See id. at 37 (citation omitted).
38 See PAnUCIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNEs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE,
INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM Tim
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SuRvEY 2 (1998).
39 See id. at4.
40 See id. at 2-3 (stating that 25% of women and 8% of men have been raped or assaulted
by a current or former partner; 8% of women and 2% of men have been stalked; 1 in 6 women
and I in 33 men have experienced attempted or completed rape). In domestic violence cases,
the disparity between women's and men's rate of victimization increases as the severity of the
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women has increased even while the rate for young men has declined, causing a
"gender gap" of violence.41 Moreover, the overwhelming majority of
perpetrators of violent crimes against women are men.42
Unlike violence against men, violence against women takes place
predominantly within preexisting relationships. Women are six times more likely
than men to be the victim of a violent crime committed by a current or former
spouse or intimate partner.43 According to a major federal study of the subject,
"[v]iolence against women is primarily partner violence."44 Whereas men are
usually attacked by strangers and acquaintances, over three-quarters of women
who have been raped and/or physically assaulted during adulthood were attacked
by a current or former husband or intimate partner;45 another nine percent were
victimized by a relative other than a husband.46 A recent in-depth study of
female homicides in New York City found that 63 percent of all women
homicide victims were killed by an intimate partner or family member. 47
Contrary to the common myth that most women are raped by strangers,48 the
largest category of rapists is comprised of present and former husbands and
boyfriends, fathers and stepfathers, and other relatives. 49 Thus, marriage, family,
assault increases. While women are 2 to 3 times more likely than men to report that an intimate
partner threw something that could hurt or pushed, grabbed, or shoved them, women are seven
to fourteen times more likely to report that an intimate partner beat them up, choked or tried to
drown them, threatened them with a gun, or actually used a gun on them. See id. at 7.
41 See S. REP. No. 101-540, at 30-31 (1990) (citation omitted).
42 See TJADEN & THOENNEs, supra note 38, at 8. Partner battering in lesbian relationships
is a serious problem that deserves further attention. See generally, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb,
Describing Without Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse
ofIntimate Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582 (1996); Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises:
Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567
(1990). However, the number of such cases is dwarfed by the number of cases of male-on-
female intimate violence.
4 3 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SuRvEY 1 (1995).
44 See TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 38, at 2, 8.
4 5 See id.
4 6 See id. at 8.
4 7 See SUSAN A. WILT ET AL., N.Y. Crrv DEP'T OF HEALTH, FEMALE HOMICIDE VICTIMs
IN NEW YORK CITY 1990-1994 at 12 (1997) (observing that 49% of perpetrators were intimate
partners, including current or former husband, boyfriend, or same-sex partner;, 14% were other
family members; 94% ofperpetrators of female homicides were male).
48 Se, e.g., SUSAN ESTRICI, REAL RAPE 8-26 (1987); Lynn Hecht Schaftan, Writing and
Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 984-86 (1993).
49 A large national study found that 46% of women who have ever been raped were
assaulted by a present or former husband, boyfriend, father or stepfather, or other family
member;, 22% were raped by a stranger;, and 29% were raped by other nonrelatives, such as
2000]
OIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
cohabitation, and dating are the primary sources of women's exposure to violent
crime.
Given the profound and disproportionate impact of violence on the lives of
women, it is not surprising that feminists have made violence a target for social
and legal reform. From the Declaration of Sentiments adopted at the Seneca Falls
Convention of 1848, which assailed the right of husbands to "administer
chastisement' by beating their wives, 50 to the founding of battered women's
shelters and rape crisis centers in the 1970s,5 1 to the feminist outcry over the O.J.
Simpson case,52 violence against women has often occupied a prominent place
on the women's rights agenda.
Feminist theorists have devoted considerable attention to the significance of
male violence as both a symptom and a cause of women's oppression.53 In
particular, Catharine MacKinnon has made the issue of violence against women
friends and neighbors. See NATIONAL VICTM CnR. & CRIME VlCTIMS RESEARCH AND
TREATMENT CTR., RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 4 (1992).
50 See BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: HISTORY,
PRACnCE, AND THEORY 39 (2d ed. 1996) (reprinting the Declaration of Sentiments adopted at
the first Women's Rights Convention held in Seneca Falls, New York, on July 19, 1848).
5 1 See, e.g., MARY P. KOss ET AL., No SAFE HAVEN: MALE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
AT HOME, AT WORK, AND IN THE COMMUNITY 102-04, 217-20 (1994); SUSAN SCHECHTER,
WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT 29-79 (1982).
52 See, e.g., Charisse Jones, Nicole Simpson, in Death, Lifling Domestic Violence to the
Forefront as a National Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at A28.
53 The overview provided in this Article of some feminist theorists' descriptions of
violence against women as a form of sex discrimination is not meant to suggest that feminists
are unanimous in interpreting the relationship between violence and sex inequality. Some
feminist writers do not emphasize violence in their analysis. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, The
Liberal Future of Relational Feminism: Robin West's Caring for Justice, 24 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 477, 478 (1999) (book review) (describing "cultural" or "relational" feminist thought).
Others actively dissent from the view that violent victimization is central to the female
experience. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in
Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995) (discussing opponents of "dominance
feminism," including the "feminist sex radicals" of the mid-1980s and popular writers such as
Camille Paglia, Katie Roiphe, and Naomi Wolf). Some feminist scholars call for shifting the
discussion of violence against women to highlight women's capacity for resistance. See, e.g.,
id. at 361-76 (propounding theory of "partial agency" to explain women's resistance to
violence under conditions of gender-based constraints). Still others accentuate the race- and
class-specific effects of violence on women's lives. See generally, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas
by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 (1994).
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central to her influential "dominance" theory of feminism, which postulates that
gender inequality is primarily a function of the differential distribution of power
between men and women. 54 Acts of male violence against women, according to
MacKinnon, "express and actualize the distinctive power of men over women in
society."55 The fact that such acts are de facto permitted (despite being
prohibited de jure) "confirms and extends" that power. 56 Robin West also
emphasizes violence in her analysis, with special attention to the role of male
violence in shaping the distinctive characteristics of female lives and
experiences. She describes "the subordination of women through violence and
the threat of violence" as a "profound infringement of women's liberty" that
"compromises women's physical security and psychological well-being" in ways
not experienced by men.57 West contends that actual and potential victimization
sharply constrain women's activities, choices, and very selves, rendering
women's lives fundamentally different from-and more painful than-the lives
of men.58
The key message of these feminist theorists is that violence against women
is a form of sex discrimination. As such, it constitutes an assault on the status of
women as a group.59 In the view of Catharine MacKinnon, women are targeted
for violence "because they are women: not individually or at random, but on the
basis of sex, because of their membership in a group defined by gender."60
Violence based on the victim's membership in a disadvantaged group has
54 See CATHtARINE A. MACKiNNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 40-41 (1987) ("Gender is
also a question of power, specifically of male supremacy and female subordination.");
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEmNisT THEORY OF TBE STATE 160 (1989) ("Gender
is a social system that divides power.").
55 See MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEM]NIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 54, at 127.
5 6 See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 54, at 5.
57 ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 116-20 (1994).
58 See id. at 116; see generally Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic
Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WiS. WOMEN's LJ. 81
(1987).
59 The current discussion should not be taken to suggest that all crimes committed against
women are necessarily or exclusively sex discriminatory. See generally Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work
on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520 (1992). However, there is clearly a large category of
crimes in which women are victimized at least in part because they are women. The Violence
Against Women Act's civil rights provision is designed to identify and address that category,
by creating a civil right to be free from "crimes of violence motivated by gender." For
discussion of how that phrase is defined, see infra Part IV.C.
60 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1301 (1991).
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uniquely damaging effects. 6' First, discriminatory violence is particularly
harmful to its victims, who suffer not only the physical and emotional injury of
the crime itself but also the added psychic injury of knowing they were
victimized because of their group identity.62 Second, group-based violence
serves a terroristic function, intimidating not only the individual who has been
attacked but all other members of the same group who fear that they could be
next. Thus, all women-including those who have not been direct victims-pay
the price for violence against women in lost options, autonomy, and peace of
mind.63 And finally, group-based violence serves the broader function of
reinforcing the prevailing subordination of the targeted group.64 In this way,
violence against women is an instrument of social control.
For all these reasons, feminist scholars and activists have urged that effective
legal remedies be made available to redress and deter violence against women. 65
Moreover, to the extent that violence against women is not merely an injury to a
particular individual but is a collective injury to women as a class, not just any
type of legal remedy will do. Conventional tort and criminal remedies do not
identify and respond to the discriminatory aspect of violence committed on the
basis of the victim's group membership.66 The paradigmatic legal remedy for
61 See generally, e.g., Frederick M. Lawrence, The Punishment of Hate: Toward a
Normative Theory of Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 MICH. L. REv. 320 (1994); Steven Bennet
Weisburd & Brian Levin, "On the Basis of Sex" Recognizing Gender-Based Bias Crimes, 5
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 21 (1994).
62 See IARY BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 203
(1994).
63 See generally MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, TIE FEMALE FEAR 1-3
(1989); see also MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 54, at 7 ("[W]omen must
spend an incredible amount of time, life, and energy cowed, fearful, and colonized, trying to
figure out how not to be next on the list."); WEST, supra note 57, at 116 ("[IThe fear of the
potential for sexual violence from husbands, partners, potential partners, acquaintances, or
strangers leaves all women, not just abused wives and rape victims, considerably more
vulnerable, more dependent, and more constrained than our brothers, fathers, sons, and
husbands.").
64 See MacKinnon, supra note 60, at 1302 ("Sexual violation symbolizes and actualizes
women's subordinate social status to men .... Rape is an act of dominance over women that
works systemically to maintain a gender-stratified society in which women occupy a
disadvantaged status.. ").
65 See generally Schneider, supra note 10.
66 Progressive scholars have begun to explore the potential of tort and criminal law to
respond to the concept of social injury or group harm. See generally, eg., Adrian Howe, The
Problem of Privatized Injuries: Feminist Strategies for Litigation, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF
LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 148 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds.,
1991); Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re) Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power,
and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.. 848. However, unlike civil rights laws prohibiting
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discrimination is federal civil rights law.67 A federal civil rights remedy is the
ideal way to recognize and redress the social, rather than merely individual, harm
inflicted by violence against women.68
Civil rights protection is not only justified by the nature of violence against
women as a group-based denial of equality, but is also necessary as a
precondition for enjoyment of all the other civil rights guaranteed to women.
Ostensibly equal opportunities in employment,69 education,70 the family,71 the
community,72 and the nation at large73 are little more than empty promises if
women must jeopardize their bodily integrity and sometimes their lives to pursue
those opportunities.74 Violence fundamentally erodes women's status as equal
citizens.75 An effective legal remedy for such violence must reinforce women's
status as equal citizens, a function that only federal civil rights law can fully
discrimination, conventional tort and criminal remedies do not vindicate the victim's and
society's interest in social equality.
67 See Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong. 41-42 (1993) (statement of Professor Burt Neubome, New York University School of
Law) [hereinafter 1993 House Hearing].
68 Catharine MacKinnon notably developed this argument in connection with sexual
harassment See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DIScRaiiNATION (1979).
State and federal statutes imposing criminal sanctions for hate crimes are another vehicle
for redressing discriminatory violence, and feminists have argued for inclusion of gender-
motivated violence in such statutes. See generally Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated
Violence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV.
WOMEN'S L. J. 123 (1999). However, a civil remedy under federal civil rights law, such as that
provided by VAWA, offers unique advantages to plaintiffs. See infra Part IV.C.
69 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
70 See Education Amendments of 1972, tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
71 See generally, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (requiring sex equality
in legal rules governing control of property during marriage); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)
(requiring sex equality in legal rules goveming alimony); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975)
(requiring sex equality in legal rules goveming child support).
72 See SUSAN D. Ross Er AL., THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 292-96 (3d ed. 1993) (describing
public accommodations laws).
73 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XIX.
74 As discussed below, women are likely to become victims of violence when they
attempt to exercise their independence in areas such as education and employment See infra
Part V.B.2.
75 See WEST, supra note 57, at 116-20; see generally Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights
Remedies for Battered Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 LAW & INEQ. J. 1 (1992); Brande
Stellings, The Public Harm of Private Violence: Rape, Sex Discrimination and Citizenship, 28




Despite these considerations, for most of the history of this country, legal
recourse for violence against women has been unavailable or narrowly
circumscribed.76 Even after the states began to adopt increasingly effective
criminal and civil remedies for rape and domestic violence, and even after
federal civil rights protections for women expanded dramatically, federal civil
rights law generally offered no relief for violence against women.77 This
omission was not corrected until the Violence Against Women Act was enacted
in 1994. In order to understand the longstanding exclusion of violence against
women from the law in general, and from federal civil rights law in particular, it
is necessary to examine the legacy of the public-private distinction. That is the
subject of the following section.
1H. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMIES AND FEMINIST CRITIQUES
American law has long embraced a fimdamental distinction between the
public and the private.78 Feminists have identified and critiqued two versions of
7 6 See generally Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Law". Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape
Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1013 (1991).
7 7 See infra Part III.C.
7 8 Although categorization is basic to human thought, see GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN,
FIRE, AND DANGEROUS TINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT TE MIND 5-6 (1987),
categories are not inevitably dichotomous. For example, some social theorists characterize
society in terms of a trichotomy consisting of the public sphere, the private sphere, and societal
forces that mediate between the two. See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 231 (Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence trans.,
1989) (noting that "[s]tate and society penetrate each other and bring forth a middle sphere of
semipublic, semiprivate relationships"); see also AMITAIETZIONI, THENEW GOLDEN RuLE 142
(1996) (describing community as third pillar of society, along with market and state); ADAM B.
SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIErY 5 (1992) (characterizing civil society as synthesis of
public and private); ALAN WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND MORAL OBLIGATION
188-89 (1989) (presenting civil society as a third force deserving recognition along with
market and state). Nevertheless, dichotomies in general, and the dichotomy between public and
private in particular, have been uniquely pervasive and influential in American legal thought.
See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 53, at 350 (noting that the "public/private divide... retains
considerable organizing power in legal thought"); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline
of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (1982) ('The history of
legal thought since the turn of the century is the history of the decline of a particular set of
distinctions-those that, taken together, constitute the liberal way of thinking about the social
world. Those distinctions [include] state/society, publicprivate, individual/group....).
Because descriptions of the world as a series of opposing pairs so often associate men with one
category and women with the opposite (usually inferior) category, such dualities have been of
particular interest to feminists. See, e.g., Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF
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this dichotomy that have been particularly powerful in shaping the social and
legal status of women: the split between the market and the family and the split
between the state and civil society.79 At the height of their influence, these
distinctions exercised substantial control over the development of law in a
variety of areas, including violence against women.
In the decades preceding the introduction of the Violence Against Women
Act in 1990, the constitutive power of both the market-family dichotomy and the
state-civil dichotomy began to wane. Increasingly, the law became willing to
interfere actively in the "private" family sphere, and courts began to recognize
the applicability of constitutionally-based claims against private, as well as state,
actors. Yet despite these signs of erosion, the dichotomies between public and
private remained a strong influence on the law. Consequently, traditional notions
of privacy continued to pose a formidable obstacle to obtaining federal civil
rights protection from gender-motivated violence.
A. The Market-Family Dichotomy
1. Overview of the Market-Family Dichotomy
The demarcation between market and family has played a major role in
prescribing and enforcing "voman's place." This version of the public-private
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRrIQUE, supra note 5, at 453; Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence
and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory ofJustice, 16
N. MEx. L. REv. 613,617-18 (1986).
79 See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983) [hereinafter The Family and the Market]. As
Frances Olsen has pointed out, the law recognizes at least three categories of activities as
"private": activities that belong to the sphere of the family rather than the marketplace;
activities committed by a private actor rather than a state actor (in other words, activities that
arise in the sphere of civil society rather than the sphere of the state); and activities that are
included within the substantive constitutional right of privacy. Olsen, supra note 4, at 320-21.
The third category, a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article, is in large part
an outgrowth of the other two. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE, supra note 54, at 184-94 (critiquing constitutional right of privacy's reliance on
liberal ideal of separation between the state and civil society); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who
Owns the Child? ": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV.
995, 997 (1992) (tracing origins of substantive constitutional privacy right to law's traditional
deference to private, patriarchal family). An additional category of "private" activities is
delineated by the tort of invasion of privacy, which is also beyond the scope of this Article. See
generally Ruth Colker, Pornography and Privacy: Towards the Development of a Group
Based Theory For Sex Based Intrusions of Privacy, 1 LAW & INEQ. J. 191 (1983); see also
Anita L. Allen, The Jurispolitics of Privacy, in RECONSTRUCrlNG POLITICAL THEORY:
FEMINISTPERSPECIVES 68, 75-80 (Mary Lyndon Shanley & UmaNarayan eds., 1997).
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dichotomy reached its fullest expression in the separate spheres ideology that
gained prominence during the nineteenth century. With the rise of
industrialization and the resulting movement of work away from the home, a cult
of domesticity arose to celebrate the perceived gulf between home and
marketplace. 80 According to this ideology, men are naturally suited to the public
world of labor and commerce, while women are destined for the private sphere
of home and hearth, where they bear and rear children and provide men with a
refuge from the rigors of the outside world.81 Justice Bradley's frequently-
quoted concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois82 provides a classic statement of this
view:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman... The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that
which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.... The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother.83
The impact of the separate spheres ideology on the law was profound and
took the form of two basic precepts that interacted to deny women equality
inside and outside the home.84 First because the private sphere of home and
family was considered to be the only proper domain for women, legal rules often
made it impossible for women to fimction independently in the public sphere,
which included government and law as well as the market.85 Second, while the
marketplace was viewed as public and therefore an appropriate subject for legal
intervention, the domestic sphere was idealized as a private realm in which
80 See generally Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note 79, at 1499-1501.
81 See generally NANCY F. CoTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD 63-100 (1977); John
Demos, The American Family in Past Time, in 2 HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES:
HOUSEHOLD CONSTTON AND FAMILY RELATONSHIPS 3, 13-15 (Nancy F. Cott ed., 1992);
Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, AMER. Q. 151 (1966).
82 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
83 Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). Bradwell upheld the State of Illinois's exclusion of
women from admission to the bar. Seen in light of the market-family dichotomy, allowing
women to practice law would presumably endanger the sanctity of the home in at least two
ways: first, by polluting the domestic sphere (as embodied by the woman) with the taint of
commerce; and second, by bringing the law (again, as embodied by the woman) into the home.
84 See generally Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women's
Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLMcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSwE CRmQUE, supra




affection, not law, would rule; therefore, the law adopted a policy of refusing to
intrude in the family.86
One instrument for carrying out these dual purposes was the doctrine of
coverture, which can be traced back at least as far as Blackstone and remained a
prominent feature of family law until well into the twentieth century. The
doctrine of coverture is premised on the theory of marital unity. According to
Blackstone, a woman who enters marriage surrenders her legal identity to her
husband and enters into the state of coverture, during which "the husband and
wife are one person in law."87 Accordingly, Blackstone concluded, a legal action
between the spouses is a logical impossibility. The law cannot interpose itself
between husband and wife because the two are legally considered one person.88
The view of the family as exempt from legal interference thus arises naturally
from the doctrine of coverture. Similarly, the doctrine of coverture supports the
goal of confining women to the private, domestic sphere. Blackstone did not
explicitly describe the family as a haven from the world of commerce-that
conception did not arise until much later-but he did emphasize the married
woman's inability to sue or be sued without her husband.89 Deprived of the right
to enforce contracts or sue in tort, married women were effectively excluded
from independent participation in the marketplace.90 Thus, for women, the
doctrine of marital unity, embodied in the rules of coverture, made the family
and the market mutually exclusive alternatives. 91
86 See id.; Siegel, supra note 76, at 2142-70.
87 1 WLLIAM BLACKSTONF, CoMMENTARIEs *430.
88 See id.
89 See id. at *431.
90 Justice Bradley's notorious concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, quoted in the text
accompanying note 83 supra, relied in part on the disabilities imposed by coverture for his
conclusion that women should not be permitted to practice law:
The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong,
to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and
independent career from that of her husband. So firmly fixed was this sentiment in the
founders of the common law that it became a maxim of that system ofjurisprudence that a
woman had no legal existence separate from her husband.... [A] married woman is
incapable, without her husband's consent, of making contracts which shall be binding on
her or him. This very incapacity was one circumstance which the Supreme Court of
Illinois deemed important in rendering a married woman incompetent fully to perform the
duties and trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and counselor.
Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
91 Coverture did grant a wife the right to purchase "necessaries" at her husband's
expense, giving her some access to the market as a consumer, if not as a producer. See
BLACKSTONE, supra note 87, at *430. However, the cause of action to enforce the right of
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In short, the market-family dichotomy supported a legal system that
consigned women to a domestic sphere in which the law then refused to
intervene.92 The law's tendency to exclude women from the public sphere and
ignore them in the private sphere has been reflected in numerous areas of legal
doctrine. Echoing Blackstone, early common law prohibited married women
from making contracts, keeping their wages, entering professions, establishing a
separate domicile, and buying, selling or owning property-all of which
prevented them from participating as individuals in the economic world outside
the home.93 The denial of the franchise barred women from direct participation
in government. Meanwhile, the law's policy of nonintervention in the family was
expressed well into the twentieth century in cases refusing to enforce the
common law right of support within marriage94 and invalidating intrafamilial
contracts for financial support.95
2. Implications of the Market-Family Dichotomy for Violence Against
Women
Nowhere has the law's adherence to the ideology of nonintervention in the
family been more evident than in its treatment of violence against women.
Doctrines like interspousal tort immunity, parental tort immunity, and the marital
rape exemption in criminal law have ensured that the law historically provided
little or no recourse for wife battering, incest and marital rape.96
necessaries lies with the creditor, not the wife. See JuDmTH AREEN, FAMILY LAW 101 (4th ed.
1999).
92 In an evocative figure of speech, a number of nineteenth century cases refusing redress
for domestic violence employed the metaphor of a curtain concealing the home from public
scrutiny. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874) ("If no permanent injury has been
inflicted, nor malice, cruelty nor dangerous violence shown by the husband, it is better to draw
the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive."); State v.
Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453, 457 (1868) (noting that "however great are the evils of ill
temper, quarrels, and even personal conflicts inflicting only temporary pain, they are not
comparable with the evils which would result from raising the curtain, and exposing to public
curiosity and criticism, the nursery and the bed chamber"); State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 262,
263 (1864) (noting that "unless some permanent injury be inflicted, or there be an excess of
violence ... the law will not invade the domestic forum, or go behind the curtain"). See
generally Siegel, supra note 76, at 2168-69 (discussing curtain as metaphor for marital
privacy).
93 See Taub & Schneider, supra note 84, at 153.
94 See generally, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953).
95 See generally, e.g., Graham v. Graham 33 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Mich. 1940); Borelli v.
Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Ct. App. 1993).
96 See generally, e.g., Joyce McConnell, Incest as Conundrum: Judicial Discourse on
Private Wrong and Public Harm, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 143 (1992) (discussing parental tort
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The denial of criminal and tort remedies for violence committed within
marriage has a legal pedigree reaching back hundreds of years. As explicated by
Blackstone, coverture entails the right of chastisement, according to which the
husband may use "moderate correction" to discipline his wife.97 The inability of
a wife to sue her husband in tort arose directly from the rule that "the husband
and wife are one person in law."98 The marital rape exemption, which
immunizes men from prosecution for raping their wives, also has roots in the
venerable marital unity doctrine.99
Today, the doctrines of interspousal tort immunity, parental tort immunity,
and the marital rape exemption have been largely but not entirely abrogated.100
Lingering concerns about family privacy continue to shape the law of marital
rape.' 01 When laws do permit civil or criminal redress for domestic violence,
police, prosecutors and courts are typically reluctant to enforce them, preferring
to treat violence in the family as a private matter for the parties to work out
themselves.1 02
immunity); Siegel, supra note 76 (discussing interspousal tort immunity); Note, To Have and
To Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1255 (1986) (discussing marital rape exemption).
97 BLACKSTONE, supra note 87, at *432. Reva Siegel has shown that during the
nineteenth century, judges shifted from the right of chastisement to the ideology of family
privacy as the preferred justification for judicial inaction in domestic violence cases; however,
legal redress was equally likely to be denied under both rationales. See Siegel, supra note 76, at
2121-41.
98 BLACKSTONE, supra note 87, at *430.
99 See WEST, supra note 57, at 59 (tracing marital rape exemption in part to "the common
law's assumption that marriage results in the unification of husband and wife and that marital
rape thus constitutes rape of oneself, a legal impossibility"); Note, To Have and to Hold, supra
note 96, at 1256 (discussing marital unity as a basis for marital rape exemption).
100 In six states, the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity still bars some or all intentional
tort claims between spouses. See 6 FAMILY LAW & PRACTICE 67A-1 to 67A-5 (Arnold H.
Rutkin ed., 1999). A parent's immunity from lawsuits brought by a child still exists, in whole
or in part, in 33 states. See Sean S. Modjarrad, Comment, Hartman v. Hartman: Is "Parental
Immunity" Recognized?, 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 463, 471-73 (1998). The majority of states
retain some vestige of the common-law marital rape exemption by criminalizing a narrower
range of sexual offenses within marriage than outside of it, subjecting sexual offenses within
marriage to less severe punishments, or creating special procedural hurdles for marital rape
prosecutions. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape,
88 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2000) (citing statutes).
101 See, eg., WEST, supra note 57, at 61 (identifying protection of marital privacy as an
argument in support of marital rape exemption); Hasday, supra note 100 (citing arguments
based on marital privacy advanced by modem defenders of marital rape exemption).
102 See generally, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990);
Thurman v. Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
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Although intrafamily violence cases provide the most fertile ground for
application of family privacy considerations, 103 those considerations spill over
into cases involving other types of violence against women as -well. The legal
system, predisposed by the separate spheres ideology to see a link between
women and the domestic sphere, often treats any kind of preexisting relationship
between a female victim and her assailant as if it were a family relationship, with
the result that the same "hands-off' treatment applies. For example, cases of
rapes committed by dates, boyfriends, acquaintances, and other nonstrangers are
far less likely to result in prosecution and conviction than rapes by strangers. 104
The response to such cases, as to cases of marital rape, is conditioned by the
law's reluctance to interfere in ongoing relationships.' 05 Carrying this reasoning
to an extreme, judges and lawyers have occasionally construed the sexual contact
between a rapist and rape victim as an intimate relationship in itself, by this
logic, the forced sexual contact constitutes a private interaction entitled to legal
noninterference rather than a public act subject to full legal consequences.' 0 6 A
similar pattern emerges in the legal response to homicides of women. The lenient
treatment traditionally available to a husband who discovered his wife in the act
of adultery and murdered her in the "heat of passion" is increasingly being
applied to cases of men who murdered a girlfriend, fiancee, or former wife in
response to her real or imagined departure or disloyalty.'0 7
In sum, by viewing not only marriage but many other kinds of relationships
as domestic, private, and therefore at least partly immune from legal scrutiny, the
law has failed to protect women from exactly the type of violence they are most
likely to experience.
3. Feminist Critiques of the Market-Family Dichotomy
As we have seen, the market-family dichotomy equates the market with the
public, the male, and the presence of law. In opposition to each of those
103 See generally Siegel, supra note 76 (analyzing impact of family privacy ideology on
domestic violence law).
104 See generally ESHuCH, supra note 48; LINDA A. FAIRSTEIN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE: OUR
WAR AGAINST RAPE 129-36, 151-52 (1993); Schafran, supra note 48.
105 See WEST, supra note 57, at 72 (describing "shadow resemblance" of date rape and
acquaintance rape to marital rape and resulting failure to impose serious legal and social
sanctions).
106 See, e.g., infra Part 1m.B.3 (discussing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997));
infra note 248 (discussing In re Judge John J. Fromer, Determination of the New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct, Oct. 25, 1984, at 2).
107 See generally Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modem Law Reform and the
Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997).
[Vol. 61:1
VIOLENCEAGAINST WOMEN
categories, it equates the family with the private, the female, and the absence of
law. Feminist scholars have developed a variety of critiques of these
assumptions. 108
First, the market-family dichotomy is based on myth, not on an accurate
description of American society. During the early history of this country,
households were intimately involved in economic production; the family was
regarded as "a little commonwealth," fully integrated with the economic and
political life of the community.109 Even during the nineteenth century, when the
separate spheres ideology was most widely accepted, the assertion that the
market and the family are separate spheres, and that men occupy the former and
women the latter, had little in common with reality. The lives of slave women,
immigrant women, factory girls and pioneer women diverged radically from the
image of homebound, passive women celebrated by the cult of domesticity.110
Moreover, white middle- and upper-class women, whose circumstances
permitted lives more closely approximating the ideal of the "angel of the house,"
frequently organized themselves into voluntary associations that worked publicly
and effectively on diverse charitable, political, and legal causes.111 Thus,
although the market-family dichotomy has had considerable force as a normative
concept, 12 it fails as an empirical description of current or past social
arrangements.113
It also fails as a description of economic arrangements. Contrary to the
vision of the family and the market as separate and irreconcilable, the family is
an economic unit that is interdependent with larger economic forces. 114
108 For a survey of feminist criticism of privacy, see generally, e.g., Ruth Gavison,
Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992); Olsen, supra note 4.
As discussed further below, feminist criticism of the public-private distinction does not
necessarily take the position that no such distinction is justified. See infra Part III.BA.
10 9 See JOHN DEMos, A LIrTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY
(1970); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEEInH-CENTURY AMERICA 4-5 (1985).
110 See Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:" Toward a
History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819, 861-77; see also ALICE KESSLER-HARRiS,
OUT To WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 20-141 (1982)
(describing women in the wage labor force during the nineteenth century).
I11 See Minow, supra note 110, at 877-82.
112 See id at 869-77 (describing aspirations toward conventional domesticity among
nineteenth century working women).
113 See generally Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's Place:
The Rhetoric of Women's History, 75 J. AM. HIST. 9 (1988) (characterizing "separate spheres"
as a trope rather than literal description).
114 The preeminent exponent of economic analysis of the family is Nobel Prize winner
Gary Becker. See generally GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991). Although
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Decisions about how to allocate resources and roles within the family have major
economic repercussions for the individuals involved and for society as a
whole.115 Women's unpaid labor, like their paid labor, has always played an
important role in the market economy. 116 Unpaid domestic labor has significant
market value and substitutes for services that would otherwise have to be
purchased in the marketplace. 117 The very fact that domestic labor is unpaid can
be seen as a market decision, one made by and for the benefit of market
actors.11
8
Just as the market and family are intertwined, so too the law is not and
cannot be absent from the domestic sphere. The "private" sphere of the family
has always been subject to legal regulation."19 In fact, during the period when the
separate spheres ideology was at its height, laws regulating family relationships
were proliferating. 12 0 The family, far from being an institution that is exempt
from law, is an institution that has been powerfully shaped by law.
To the extent that the law's professed policy of noninterference in the
domestic sphere has been applied at all, it has not been applied even-handedly.
Race and class bias are evident in selective enforcement of laws forbidding
domestic violence.' 2 ' Families that are perceived as deviant-single-mother
families, families of welfare recipients, gay and lesbian families-are
Becker's specific economic calculations are subject to criticism for their reliance on
questionable assumptions about gender roles, economic analysis can nevertheless provide
important insights about the family. See generally Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and
Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997) (examining unpaid domestic
labor in economic terms).
115 See Taub & Schneider, supra note 84, at 155-56 ('The family is the locus of
fundamental economic exchanges .... ).
116 See Joyce McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207,243-47 (1992).
117 See generally, e.g., Silbaugh, supra note 114; Gary S. Becker, Housework The
Missing Piece of the Economic Pie, BusINEss WEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 30.118 See Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note 79, at 1499-1500 (describing
female domestic role as necessary to sustain capitalism).
119 See Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L.
REV. 1073, 1105 n.172 (1994).
120 See Taub & Schneider, supra note 84, at 153 (discussing the Married Women's
Property Acts); Siegel, supra note 76, at 2182 (discussing statutes restricting abortion,
contraception and polygamy); see generally GROSSBERG, supra note 109 (tracing the
emergence of domestic relations laws in the nineteenth century); Jill Elaine Hasday,
Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998) (discussing federal
law on polygamy, slave marriage, and parent's control of child's labor).
121 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 76, at 2134-41 (describing race and class bias in the
nineteenth-century criminal justice system's response to wife-beating).
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particularly likely to be the subject of direct legal control.122
In any event as long as there are families and law, legal involvement in the
family is inevitable. At a minimum, the existence of a legally recognized
category known as "family" requires the law to assert itself to define which
groups fall into that category. 123 The very conception of the family as a zone of
privacy has been created and enforced by legal tools deployed in the public
sphere.124 The private sphere is not isolated from the public sphere, but is
defined by and dependent on it 125
Furthermore, as long as law exists, it inevitably intervenes in the family,
either by imposing affirmative rules or by refusing to do so. When the law fails
to come to the aid of a family member seeking resolution of a dispute, it has the
effect of reinforcing the power inequities of the status quo.126 For example, an
avowed policy of nonintervention in cases of domestic violence has the outcome
of condoning wife battering, thereby providing men with a mechanism for
exercising disproportionate power within the family.127 Since any conceivable
response (or lack thereof) from the legal system will have the result of
strengthening the position of one or another participant in a family dispute, there
is no meaningful possibility of "nonintervention." True legal neutrality in the
domestic sphere is a logical impossibility.128
If, as the preceding discussion suggests, the market-family dichotomy is
inaccurate, inequitably applied, and logically incoherent what function does it
122 See generally MARTHA A. FNEMAN, THE NEurtERED MOTHER, THE SExuAL FAMILY,
AND OTHER TWENTIET CENTRY TRAGEDIES (1995).
123 See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 6, at 129. Because of the numerous legal and financial
consequences that flow flom the presence or absence of legally-recognized family
relationships, there is a considerable amount of litigation over questions of who is and who is
not a spouse, a parent, or other family member. See generally Martha Minow, Redefining
Families: Wo's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 269 (1991).
124 See Cahn, supra note 119, at 1112 (stating that the family represents a private haven
only to the extent that public laws and decisions have created and maintained it); Siegel, supra
note 76, at 2183 ("Judges rhetorically constructed the world 'outside' the boundaries of law in
the course of invoking it as a 'reason' for the legal decisions they sought to justify.").
125 See Schneider, supra note 10, at 38.
126 See generally Taub & Schneider, supra note 84, at 156; Frances E. Olsen, The Myth
ofState Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985).
127 See Schneider, supra note 10, at 38; Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note
79, at 1510. As Reva Siegel has demonstrated, the adoption of privacy rhetoric during the
nineteenth century as a rationale for not intervening in cases of domestic violence, far from
being neutral, ensured that men would be able to continue dominating women and children in
the family as they had done under the earlier common law right of chastisement. See generally
Siegel, supra note 76.
12 8 See generally Olsen, supra note 126.
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serve? One answer is that it simultaneously fortifies and conceals unequal power
relations between men and women. 129 Designating the domestic sphere as
private ensures that those who lack power within that sphere will continue to
experience uncertainty and insecurity within it, while those who possess power
will continue to enjoy its benefits. 130 Furthermore, placing a veil of privacy over
family interactions conceals from the participants and from society as a whole
the public significance of those interactions-that is, the extent to which
gendered patterns within the family mirror and support larger social patterns of
sex inequality in society.1 31 When women internalize the message that
interactions in the family are personal, it becomes impossible to take political or
legal action to change the family.1 32 In addition, declaring the home to be the
woman's sphere, and then declaring that sphere to be separate from the legal
order, devalues and discredits women as a group by implying that they are not
important enough to merit the concern of the legal system.133
The market-family dichotomy and its attendant assumptions about gender
and the role of law have been exiraordinarily influential, not as an empirical
description nor as a coherent legal rule, but as an ideology.134 The next
subsection considers the distinctive impact of this ideology on federal law.
4. Impact of the Market-Family Dichotomy on Federal Law
Efforts to keep the law out of the family and the family out of the law have
been especially pronounced in the federal arena. Federal courts continue to
adhere to the domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction, which
originated as dictum in the 1859 case of Barber v. Barber.135 Although Barber
129 See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 10, at 38-40 (noting that "the rhetoric of privacy has
masked inequality and subordination" and has supported male dominance in the family);
Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note 79, at 1510 ("Tjhe assertion that family affairs
should be private has been made by men to prevent women and children from using state
power to improve the conditions of their lives .... Furthermore, men in fact use the coercive
power of the state to reinforce and consolidate their authority over wives and children.").
130 See Olsen, supra note 4, at 325; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Changing Images of the
State: Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1187-88 (1994) ("Given the
persistence of sex-based disparities in social, economic, and political power... laissez-faire
policies are not sex neutral.").
131 See OKIN, supra note 6, at 124-33 (stating that unequal allocation of power within the
family according to gender is a fundamental building block of gender-stratified society).
132 Feelings of shame and unwillingness to reveal private matters are partly responsible
for the vast underreporting of domestic violence. See Olsen, supra note 4, at 321 n.6.
133 See Taub & Schneider, supra note 84, at 156.
134 See generally Olsen, supra note 126.
135 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
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actually held that the federal court did have diversity jurisdiction to enforce a
state alimony judgment subsequent cases relied on language in the majority
opinion stating that "[w]e disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the
United States upon the subject of divorce." 136 By 1890, in In re Burrus, the
Court stated that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and
wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
United States."137 This sentiment has been so frequently repeated as to become a
truism 1 3 8
The assertion that family law belongs exclusively to the statps is clearly an
overstatement. By its terms, the domestic relations exception applies only to
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship and has no relevance to other
sources of federal jurisdiction.139 Moreover, the domestic relations exception
does not apply to all cases affecting the family. In its most recent decision on the
subject the Supreme Court reaffirmed the domestic relations exception with
respect to establishment of divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees, but held
that federal courts may hear other diversity cases involving family members,
such as tort claims or suits seeking enforcement of alimony orders. 140
In actuality, family issues have never been absent from federal law.141
However, the Court has so thoroughly believed its own rhetoric that domestic
relations are "a virtually exclusive province of the States ' 142 that it has extended
that observation beyond the limited class of diversity cases to which it properly
applies. 143 Today, it is virtually universally assumed by both federal and state
136 See, ag., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,404 (1975) (citingBarber, 62 U.S. at 584).
137 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
138 See Hasday, supra note 120, at 1304-06.
139 See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 706-07 (1992); see generally 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1994).
14 0 SeeAnkenbrandt, 504 U.S. 689,701-04.
141 See Hasday, supra note 120, at 1373-86 (documenting federal court involvement in
wide range of matters affecting the family); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender:
Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682, 1721-29, 1742-44
(1991) (same). Contrary to previous historical accounts, Jill Hasday argues that legal
developments during the Reconstruction period reveal that Congress viewed family matters-
such as polygamy, slave marriage, and the right of a parent to control a child's labor-as
appropriate subjects for federal lawmaking. See Hasday, supra note 120, at 1335-70.
142 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,404 (1975).
143 See generally, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (finding no private
federal right of action under Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act); Ohio ex rel. Popovichi v.
Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930) (declining federal jurisdiction over suit against foreign diplomat
because claim involved alimony and divorce). See also Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Bolton, 840
F. Supp. 421 (E.D. La. 1993) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over child support dispute
under federal interpleader statute).
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judges that "family life is governed by the law of the states, and that the federal
courts 'ought' not to get involved." 144
It is not inevitable that a federal system will contrive to exclude family
issues from federal jurisdiction. 145 Underlying the federal courts' reluctance to
address family-related concerns are three of the themes discussed above: the
distinctions between market and family, between public and private, and
between male and female.
First, federal jurisdiction is based on an assumption that market relations, but
not family relations, are relevant to a federal forum.146 The requirement of a
market nexus is made explicit in the "amount in controversy" requirement for
cases in which federal jurisdiction is sought on the basis of diversity of
citizenship.147 During the early twentieth century, courts and commentators
reasoned that domestic relations cases must be excluded from diversity
jurisdiction, because even if the parties were diverse, the nonmonetary nature of
family relationships means that no amount in controversy could be
established. 148 This rationale reflects the influence of the separate spheres
ideology by suggesting that the domestic sphere, where love rather than money is
the coin of the realm, is not a fit subject for adversary legal proceedings. 149 This
portrayal of family law matters as having no monetary value is thoroughly
unpersuasive, given the distinctly financial nature of alimony, child support, and
144 See Resnik, supra note 141, at 1698.
145 See Justice David M. Steinberg, Developing a Unified Family Court in Ontario, 37
FAM. & CONCiLATION Crs. REv. 454, 456 (1999) (stating that in Canada, the federal and
provincial governments share responsibility for family law). See also Mary E. Becker, The
Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights ": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. Ciii.
L. REV. 453, 511 (1992) ("[T]he Bill of Rights should make family law a matter within the
control of the national government and not the states:'); Calm, supra note 119, at 1094-97
(arguing that federalism per se does not explain federal courts' reluctance to hear family law
cases).
146 See Resnik, supra note 141, at 1696-97 ('he dichotomy... between a commercial
arena... and the domestic scene ... roughly parallels assumptions about state and federal
jurisdictional lines."). Federal jurisdiction has also traditionally embraced issues involving the
relationship of the individual to government, discussed infra at Part mI.B.2.
147 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. 1997) (establishing $75,000 amount in controversy
requirement).
148 See De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906) (stating rule that diversity
jurisdiction does not apply to divorce cases because husband and wife cannot be citizens of
different states and divorce lacks pecuniary value); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1025
(3d Cir. 1975) (listing "lack of monetary value of divorce" as one of the reasons formerly
offered for the domestic relations exception); Resnik, supra note 141, at 1746 n.337 (citing
early twentieth-century treatises).




Second, the federal courts' treatment of domestic relations issues reflects the
split between the public, as exemplified by the law, and the private, as
exemplified by the family. Barber v. Barber, the case that spawned the domestic
relations exception, was decided when the separate spheres ideology was at its
height 150 As Reva Siegel has pointed out, the reasoning of Barber rests fimly
on the doctrine of marital unity.151 In that case, the Court accepted the husband's
argument that because of marital unity, a wife cannot establish a domicile
separate from that of her husband, and therefore a married couple cannot
establish diversity of citizenship. 152 However, the majority recognized an
exception to this rule for a wife living apart from her husband under a court order
of legal separation.153
The legacy of family privacy -is even more evident in the Barber dissent,
which objected strenuously to the majority's holding that a wife may establish a
separate domicile from her husband:
It is not in accordance with the design and operation of a Government having its
origin in causes and necessities, political, general, and external, that it should
assume to regulate the domestic relations of society; should, with a kind of
inquisitorial authority, enter the habitations and even into the chambers and
nurseries of private families .... 154
This language, with its metaphor of the law physically penetrating the private
space of the home, is reminiscent of several nineteenth-century cases in which
state courts refused to interfere in domestic violence because of family privacy
considerations arising from the separate spheres ideology.155 The same concerns
about family privacy are visible in modem judicial discussions about federal
jurisdiction.156
A third possible explanation for the federal courts' unwillingness to entertain
cases involving the family lies in the tendency to equate the domestic sphere
with women.157 As Judith Resnik has observed, "Jurisdictional lines have not
150 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
151 See Siegel, supra note 76, at 2202-03.
15 2 See Barber, 62 U.S. at 594.
153 See id at 594.
15 4 See id. at 602 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
15 5 See supra note 92.
156 See Femos-Lopez v. Lopez, 929 F.2d 20, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1991) (upholding exercise
of federal jurisdiction over case arising from failure to pay child support because "addressing
the merits of petitioner's claims would not require delving into the parties' domestic affairs").
157 See Resnik, supra note 141, at 1696.
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been drawn according to the laws of nature but by men, who today are seeldng to
confirm their prestige as members of the most important judiciary in the
country... Dealing with women-in and out of families.. .-- is not how they
want to frame their job."'1 58 Accordingly, one reason for the "federal judicial
disdain for family law issues" could be gender bias.159 Associating family
related cases with women has the effect of devaluing those cases.160 Domestic
issues are generally considered not only private, but less important than other
legal issues. 161 Furthermore, since women are associated with the domestic
sphere, there is a risk that all "women's issues" will be viewed as family-related
and therefore as not belonging in federal court.162
Thus, there are many parallels between the view that the family should be
exempt from federal law and the view that the family should be exempt from law
in general. 163 The difference, of course, is that excluding family matters from
federal jurisdiction is embraced in the name of allowing the states to handle these
issues, which are purported to be uniquely within the states' competence,
interest, and power.' 64 In this vein, the Barber dissent quoted above continues,
158 Id. at 1749.
15 9 See id. at 1749, 1759.
160 See Resnik, supra note 141, at 1749-50, 1766-67. The fact that family issues are
viewed as the polar opposite of market issues, are gendered female, and are devalued is
consistent with the hierarchical structure of similar dualisms such as reason/emotion,
culturetnature, public/private, etc. For each such pair, one half is associated with men and is
privileged, and one half is associated with women and is considered inferior or at least "other."
See Olsen, supra note 78, at 453-54.
161 On the low status of family law in general and in the eyes of federal judges in
particular, see Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1210 (1994);
Cahn, supra note 119, at 1097-98, 1111-15; Minow, supra note 110, at 819.
162 See generally Resnik, supra note 141 (discussing perceived absence of both women
and family issues from the federal courts).
163 See Calm, supra note 119, at 1105 ('The rhetoric confining family law to the states is
reminiscent of earlier language that confined women to the private sphere").
164 See Resnik, supra note 141, at 1751-57. For a critical analysis of the reasons
customarily given for the domestic relations exception, including states' presumed superior
expertise and competence, see Cahn, supra note 119, at 1087-94. For a critique of the
historical argument that states have always had a monopoly on family law matters, see
generally Hasday, supra note 120.
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The Federal tribunals can have no power to control the duties or the habits of the
different members of private families in their domestic intercourse. This power
belongs exclusively to the particular communities of which those families form
parts, and is essential to the order and to the very existence of such
communities.1 65
According to this vision, the state is the family in macrocosm, but the federal
government is an entity foreign to the family and to the "communities of which
those families form parts." 166 Hence, the state shares to some degree in the
privacy of the family, while the federal government is unequivocally public. 167
The analogy between the privacy of the state and the privacy of the family is
illustrated by the use of the term "domestic" to refer to both the internal affairs of
a state and the internal affairs of a family.168
In short, federal courts are to state courts as market is to family, public is to
private, and male is to female. As the above discussion suggests, this artificial
distinction between federal and state courts with respect to family matters is
subject to the same types of criticisms that feminists have leveled at other aspects
of the market-family dichotomy.169 The claim that family issues exclusively
inhabit the state courts is as inaccurate as the claim that women exclusively
inhabit the domestic sphere. Characterizing family claims as devoid of monetary
value is as false as characterizing family life as insulated from market forces.
The view that federal law does not intervene in the family is as flawed as the
view that the law in general does not do so. The application of the domestic
relations exception to cases arising outside of the context of diversity jurisdiction
is as clear an example of overgeneralization as the application of the ideology of
legal nonintervention in the family to cases of violence occurring outside the
family. Much as the public legal sphere constructs the private domestic sphere,
the federal courts have constructed the state courts as the "natural" setting for
165 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582,602 (1859) (Daniel, J., dissenting).
166 Id. The view of the state as a body needing protection from encroachment by federal
law, much as the individual family needs protection from encroachment by law in general, has
a long history. See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet. ) 243 (1833) (repudiating federal
enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states); Daniel J. Elazar, Foreword: The Moral
Compass ofState Constitutionalism, 30 RurGERs L.J. 849, 854, 861-65 (1999).
167 See Cahn, supra note 119, at 1101-02 ('There are two aspects to the Court's
public/private dichotomy in family law: one between the states... and the family,.. . and a
second between the federal and state courts.").
168 See, e.g., JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 1 NEw COMMENTARmS ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE,
AND SEPARATION § 155, at 70 (Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co. 1891) ('The national power does
not extend to the domestic affairs of the States.") (citation omitted).
169 See supra Part IIA.3.
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family-related cases.170 Also, like the ideology of legal nonintervention in the
family, the attempt to exclude issues concerning women and the family from
federal law demeans the importance of those issues and threatens to make
women and their concerns invisible in a powerful, elite setting.
B. The State-Civil Society Dichotomy
1. Overview of the State-Civil Society Dichotomy
The second version of the public-private dichotomy concerns the distinction
between the state and civil society.' 71 According to this formulation, the world is
divided into the public realm consisting of the state and state actors, and the
private realm consisting of all nongovernmental activity.' 72 Seen through this
lens, the family and the market both occupy the private sphere, while the public
sphere is occupied exclusively by government. 173
This classic liberal distinction has ancient roots174 but derives most directly
from Locke's view of the relationship between the individual and the state.175
Locke envisioned an autonomous, prepolitical individual who wishes both to
expand and to protect his private rights and opportunities and therefore requires a
government to establish neutral, equitable laws but not to abridge his natural
rights more than necessary. 176 The liberal vision thus defines citizens as
170 For a critique of the categorical view that states are "natural" holders of power, see
generally Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism's Options, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 465
(1996). See also Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing
Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171, 174-75
(1995) (rejecting "essentialist" view that state and federal jurisdiction are foreordained,
unchanging, and mutually exclusive).
171 See Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note 79, at 1501-02.
172 See Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1672
(1997); Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note 79, at 1501.
173 See Higgins, supra note 172, at 1672; Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note
79, at 1501.
174 See Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 724-25 (1999)
(discussing distinctions between public and private spheres in classical Greece and Rome).
175 See PATEMAN, supra note 3, at 120-21; Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the
PublidPrivate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1424 (1982); Jennifer Nedelsky,
Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 7, 17
(1989).
17 6 See PATEMAN, supra note 3, at 122 (citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATI5ES OF
GOvERNMENT (P. Haslett ed., 2d ed. 1967)). Locke's natural rights theory stands in contrast to
the positivist vision of Hobbes, according to which citizens entering into civil society
relinquish all pre-existing rights and possess only those rights affirmatively granted by
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individual bearers of private rights that must be protected from encroachment by
government. 177 It follows that the Constitution is designed to protect the
individual from the state, not to protect private individuals from each other.178
2. Impact of the State-Civil Society Dichotomy on Federal Law
Even more than the split between the market and the family, the split
between the state and civil society has been a formative influence on the
development of federal law. In keeping with the Lockean vision, the limits
imposed by the federal Constitution are primarily addressed to government, not
to private behavior.179 The state action doctrine in federal constitutional law
ensures that most constitutional rights are enforceable only against the state, its
agents and acts attributable to them, not against one's fellow private citizens. 180
The state action doctrine tracks the distinction between the state and civil society.
Federal civil rights statutes, like the constitutional provisions to which they
are closely tied, have typically been aimed at inequities in the public, state
sphere. As they originally developed in the nineteenth century, federal civil
rights laws prohibited only conduct having some direct link to state authority. 181
In key civil rights statutes, the requirement that the challenged action must be
taken "under color of' state law achieves the same result as the state action
requirement in constitutional law.182 Action taken under color of state law has
lawmaking institutions. See Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg
Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1296-97 (1982).
177 See Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American
Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237,239 (1987).
178 See Brest, supra note 176, at 1299-1301 (describing state action requirement as
offshoot of natural rights theory).
179 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTTIoNAL LAW 8-9 (2d ed. 1988).
180 See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 4, at 320. Among the few constitutional guarantees that do
not require a showing of state action are the right to vote, right to travel, and rights established
by the Thirteenth Amendment See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN,
CONsIT~rIONAL LAW 963 (13th ed. 1997). For a discussion of the relaxation of the state
action requirement in some contexts, see infra Part IH.C.
181 See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding two sections of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment due to lack of showing
of state involvement); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) (holding portion of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment due to lack of
showing of state involvement); Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights
Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952) (describing narrow interpretation of federal civil
rights statutes). The expansion of federal civil rights law to include private action is discussed
infra in Part II.C.
182 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
2000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
been defined as "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law."1 83 In the absence of a "color of law" requirement, some federal civil right
statutes limit their scope to conduct that interferes with a federally-protected
right; since most constitutional rights are limited to state action, the requirement
of interference with a federally-protected right effectively excludes most conduct
by private actors.184
3. Implications of the State-Civil Society Dichotomy for Violence Against
Women
The split between the state and civil society, as embodied in federal law's
state action and color of law requirements, has been a major obstacle to obtaining
effective federal remedies for violence against women.185 Federal civil rights
law holds unique promise as a remedy for gender-motivated violence,186 but
because of requirements of state involvement, federal civil rights law was
generally unavailable for this purpose before the Violence Against Women Act
was passed.187
Under the most widely used civil rights statutes, relief is rarely available for
violence against women. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to
show that the challenged action was taken under color of state law, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) requires her to show a conspiracy to deprive her of an independent,
federally protected right. These elements are far from common in a typical rape
183 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). Ordinarily, the inquiry for
determining whether conduct is under color of state law is the same as the inquiry for
determining whether it constitutes state action. See TRIBE, supra note 179, at 1703 n.2 (citing
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,928-32 (1982)).
184 See, e.g., United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983) (holding
that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) does not apply to private interference with constitutional rights that
are protected only against government encroachment). But see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88 (1971) (holding that private conspiracy to interfere with right to travel, which is
constitutionally protected against private as well as government interference, is actionable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
185 Although state criminal and tort law do not share federal law's emphasis on
government action, state law has generally offered an inadequate response to violence against
women and fails to address the discriminatory aspect of gender-motivated violence. See supra
Parts II, I.A.2; see infra Part IV.A.
186 See supra Part II.
187 On the inadequacy of federal civil rights protection for gender-motivated violence
before enactment of the Violence Against Women Act, see generally Brenneke, supra note 75,
at 44-53; W.H. Hallock, The Violence Against Women Act: Civil Rights for Sexual Assault
Victims, 68 IND. L. 577,592-95 (1993).
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§ 1985(3) requires her to show a conspiracy to deprive her of an independent,
federally protected right. These elements are far from common in a typical rape
or domestic violence case. On the contrary, most of the violence committed
against women occurs in the context of the family and other ongoing
relationships. 188 Relatively few acts of sexual assault and battering can be
directly attributed to state actors. Almost no cases involve a conspiracy to
deprive the plaintiff of a right protected by federal law, particularly since most of
those rights require, in turn, a showing of state action.189 Therefore, laws
designed to protect individuals from state encroachment on their rights have
done little to redress the harm inflicted on women by male violence. This
omission is especially noteworthy because violence is among the principal ways
in which women's inequality is expressed and perpetuated. 190
There are, of course, cases of violence against women committed by state
actors.191 Even here, however, the reluctance to view violence against women as
belonging to the public sphere is evident. For example, in the case of United
States v. Lanier,192 the Supreme Court considered an appeal by a state judge who
had been convicted under a federal criminal civil rights statute for sexually
assaulting five women. 193 All of the women were with Judge Lanier on official
court business when he attacked them; each of the women was a former litigant
or present or potential employee over whom Judge Lanier had authority by virtue
of his office. 194 The crimes occurred in the judge's chambers during working
hours, and in at least one instance, he committed a sexual assault while wearing
his judicial robe. 195 Thus, it would seem that the element of action taken under
color of state law was established beyond any question. However, when
appealing his conviction before the Supreme Court, Judge Lanier claimed that
188 Seesupra Part Il.
189 See, e.g., United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 463 U.S. 825.
1 9 0 See supra Part II.
191 For a thoughtful discussion of sexual assault by state actors, see generally Johanna R.
Shargel, United States v. Lanier: Securing the Freedom to Choose, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1115
(1997).
192 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (vacating judgment below and remanding for consideration of
whether defendant had fair warning that his actions violated federal criminal civil rights
statute).
193 See id. The statute under which Judge Lanier was convicted criminalizes the willful
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States by persons acting under color of law. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994).
194 See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 261.
195 See United States v. Lanier, 33 F.3d 639, 646-50, 653 (6th Cir. 1994), vacated and
reh'g en banc granted, 43 F.3d 1033 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), vacated and remanded, 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
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the pretense of exercising his legitimate authority when he committed them. 196
In other words, this argument goes, violence against women is intrinsically
private and can never be considered part of the public, state sphere.197
Additionally, Judge Lanier argued that his due process rights had been violated
because he was deprived of fair warning that sexually assaulting women under
his control would be considered a violation of their constitutional rights1 98
Again, this argument rests on the assertion that violence against women is a
subject so remote from federal constitutional rights as to make it impossible to
foresee the application of the latter to the former.199
4. Feminist Critiques of the State-Civil Society Dichotomy
Although it lacks the explicit gender component of the market-family
dichotomy, the dichotomy between the state and civil society has a dramatically
different impact on women than on men. Major sites of women's oppression-
including the nongovernmental workplace and the home-are located in the
private sphere of civil society and therefore have historically not been considered
appropriate subjects for protection under federal constitutional and civil rights
law.200 Gender inequality arising from disparities in private power is invisible to
a system designed to protect individuals from state interference. "For women,
this has meant that civil society, the domain in which women are distinctively
subordinated and deprived of power, has been placed beyond reach of legal
196 See United States v. Lanier, No. 95-1717, 1997 WL 7587 at *25-*37 (Jan. 7, 1997)
(transcript of oral argument of counsel for the defendant).
197 The Supreme Court explicitly declined to address this argument. See Lanier, 520 U.S.
at 264 n.2. However, the earlier decision of the three-judge panel below, which was vacated
when the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, had specifically rejected Judge Lanier's
argument that his actions were "personal pursuits." See Lanier, 73 F.3d at 1397 (Wellford, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lanier, 33 F.3d at 653).
198 See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 265-72.
199 The Supreme Court remanded to the Sixth Circuit for a determination of whether the
statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that
the defendant's conduct was criminal. See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 272. The Sixth Circuit later
dismissed the appeal without a decision on the merits because Judge Lanier had become a
fugitive. See United States v. Lanier, 123 F.3d 945, 946 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1011 (1998).
200 See WEST, supra note 57, at 114-21; Becker, supra note 145, at 507-09; Higgins,




guarantees. Women are oppressed socially, prior to law, without express state
acts, often in intimate contexts." 20 1
Some feminists have directly challenged the natural rights theory that
underlies both the liberal distinction between public and private spheres and the
resulting conception of the Constitution as a source of negative liberties.
Catharine MacKinnon, for example, criticizes the assumption implicit in our
"constitution of abstinence" that all citizens start out on an equal footing; the
result of this assumption, she claims, is that those who possess freedoms like
equality, liberty, privacy, and speech get to keep them without government
interference, while those who lack those freedoms are not affirmatively granted
them by law.202 MacKinnon fundamentally disagrees with the belief that
government best promotes freedom when it stays out of private social
arrangements, a belief reflected in the state action doctrine.203 In her opinion,
leaving women to take their chances in civil society is tantamount to sending
them back to an unprotected state of nature.2 04 Similarly, Robin West objects to
the Constitution's failure both to prohibit abuses of private power and to
guarantee affirmative protections for groups that are subordinated in civil
society.205
Some feminists have argued that the liberal construct of the private sphere is
responsible not merely for failing to remedy women's subordination, but for
exacerbating it 20 6 By sealing off civil society in general, and the home in
particular, as a private sphere where the law may not intrude, the Constitution
protects the stronghold of patriarchy.207 As Robin West puts it, "The
Constitution protects the individual against abusive and violent state conduct but
not only does it not protect women against the abuse and violence that most
201 MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 54, at 164-65.
202 See id. at 163.
203 See id. at 164.
204 See id. at 160.
205 See WEsT, supra note 57, at 164-65.
206 See, e.g., MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 54, at
194 ("[he legal concept of privacy can and has shielded the place of battery, marital rape, and
women's exploited domestic labor. It has preserved the central institutions whereby women are
deprived of identity, autonomy, control, and self-definition."); WEST, supra note 57, at 119
('T]he Constitution is not only not a shield against injustice for women, but is itself a sword of
injustice pointed very markedly at women. It is part of the problem, not part of the solution.");
Becker, supra note 145, at 508 ("[T'he Fourth Amendment does less for women than it has
done for white men, who drafted it .... [Tjhey added the Fourth Amendment to protect
themselves from governmental intrusion .... The Fourth Amendment may have affirmatively
made women worse off by giving a constitutional foundation to the notion that a 'man's home
is his castle."').
20 7 See WEST, supra note 57, at 119-20.
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threatens them, it perversely protects the sphere of privacy and liberty within
which the abuse and violence takes place."20 8 Seen from this perspective, the
"right to privacy is a right of men 'to be let alone' to oppress women one at a
time." 209
At the same time that it fails to address inequities in the private sphere of
civil society, thd slate action doctrine als6 fails to recognize the extent to which
the state is complicit in reinforcing those inequities. The boundary between state
and private action is far more porous than the conventional definition of "state
action" acknowledges. For example, as Robin West points out, the state
contributes to the epidemic of violence against women by inadequately enforcing
laws against such violence; yet this phenomenon does not meet the generally
accepted definition of state action and therefore does not violate the
Constitution.2 10 Catharine MacKinnon argues that by forbidding violence against
women de jure but permitting it de facto, the law has done little to reduce the
frequency of such crimes and has made matters worse by conveying the
inaccurate impression that they are rare and deviant.211
Having examined some feminist critiques of both the market-family
dichotomy and the state-civil society dichotomy, it is important to point out that
feminist scholars are not in agreement on whether to preserve or eliminate these
distinctions. To say that the public-private split, in both its forms, currently
promotes male dominance does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that no
division between public and private is acceptable.212 While some feminists argue
for abolishing2 13 or transcending2 14 the public-private split, others seek to
reformulate the concept of privacy as an affirmative source of women's
autonomy.215 Nevertheless, feminist critics from all of these perspectives have
208 Id. at 120-21.
2 0 9 MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 54, at 194
(citations omitted).
2 10 See WEST, supra note 57, at 119-20. Even if a state's inadequate enforcement of laws
prohibiting violence against women does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, it
may be a sufficient basis for Congress to enact legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment See infra Part V.B.3.
211 See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 54, at 5.
212 See OKIN, supra note 6, at 127-28; Taub & Schneider, supra note 84, at 157.
2 13 See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 54, at 93-102; MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEmNI THfEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 54, at 160-70, 184-94; Margaret A.
Baldwin, Public Women and the Feminist State, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S LU. 47, 69 (1997)
(stating that "feminists have urged that 'there should be no aspect of our lives which we are
compelled to keep private"') (citing ANNE PH]HIS, ENGENDERING DEMOCRACY 109 (1991)).
214 See Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note 79, at 1529-78.
215 See, e.g., ANIrA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE
SOCIETY (1988); OKIN, supra note 6, at 127-28; see generally Allen, supra note 174; Linda C.
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joined in expressing disapproval of the public-private distinctions as they have
traditionally been formulated. 216 The following subsection will examine the
extent to which those traditional formulations began to break down in the years
preceding the introduction of the Violence Against Women Act, and the extent to
which they continued to exert influence.
C. Erosion and Endurance of the Public-Private Dichotomies
In the years leading up to the introduction of the Violence Against Women
Act in 1990, legal reforms had significantly weakened both versions of the
public-private dichotomy.
With regard to the market-family dichotomy, by the late twentieth century
the law no longer prohibited women from employment, voting, contract rights,
or the various other functions in the public sphere that had previously been
closed to them. The conviction that the law should not actively intervene in the
family was also fading. Although the law had never truly abstained from
regulating the family, it began to govern family relationships more overtly and
more extensively.217 Examples include the growing body of legislation and case
law governing divorce, cohabitation, child support, premarital and separation
agreements, and so on.218 In the area of violence against women, many states
abrogated intrafamily tort immunities219 and began to expand their criminal and
civil remedies for domestic violence. 220
At the same time, the strict separation between the state and civil society, as
exemplified by the state action and color of law requirements, also was
weakening. For the better part of a century following the Supreme Court's 1883
decision in the Civil Rights Cases, private rights of action under the
Reconstruction-era federal civil rights statutes were available only if direct state
involvement could be shown. 2 l During the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court
McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 759 (1999) [hereinafter Reconstructive Tasks]; Linda C. McClain, The Poverty
of Privacy?, 3 CoL. I GENDER & L. 119 (1992); Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts
Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1419 (1991); Schneider, supra note 10; Shargel, supra note 191.
216 See sources cited supra in notes 213-15.
2 17 See, e.g., MARTHA FWNEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALIrY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 6, 9 (1991); David Chambers, The "Legalization" of the
Family: Toward a Poliy ofSupportive Neutrality, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 805, 805-10 (1985).
2 18 See Chambers, supra note 217, at 806-09.
2 19 See supra note 100.
220 See Schneider, supra note 10, at 40-42.
221 See generally BURKE MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1964); Gressman,
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changed course and issued a series of decisions applying the nineteenth century
civil rights statutes to private actors.222 Meanwhile, Congress was passing an
assortment of new civil rights statutes prohibiting private discrimination in areas
such as employment housing, and public accommodations. 223 These statutes
were in turn upheld as legitimate exercises of Congress's constitutional
powers.2 24 In addition, in certain cases, the Court has interpreted the
constitutional state action requirement broadly enough to include nominally
private parties that were engaged in public functions or had a sufficiently close
nexus with government 2 25
However, it would be a mistake to conclude that by the late twentieth
century, the law no longer reflected the legacy of the public-private split. On the
contrary, the two versions of the public-private dichotomy remained a powerful
presence.
Long after many other manifestations of the market-family dichotomy had
disappeared from the legal landscape, resistance to legal intervention in the
family remained strong in cases of violence against women. Despite some
reforms in state law, the legal response to violence against women continued to
be inadequate. This trend is reflected in the ongoing treatment of marital rape
and other types of nonstranger rape as less serious offenses than stranger rape; in
attempts to force battered women into mediation of their disputes; and in the
persistent reluctance of police to respond vigorously to domestic violence.2 26 In
apparent deference to the marital unity theory, which gives a husband ownership
of all his wife's property during coverture, police and prosecutors rarely take
action against batterers who destroy their wives' property.227 Some states have
supra note 181.
222 See generally, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (applying 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 to private action); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (applying 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) to private action); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (applying 42
U.S.C. § 1982 to private action).
223 Examples include the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
224 See generally, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Title II
of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964) (same).
225 See generally, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)
(construing state action broadly); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)
(same). But see, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (construing state action narrowly); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978)
(same); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (same).
2 26 See Schneider, supra note 10, at 43-46; see also supra Part mIIA.2 and infra Part
IVA.
2 27 See generally Victoria L. Lutz & Cara M. Bonomolo, My Husband Just Trashed Our
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retained their spousal or parental tort immunity doctrines, blocking access to
civil relief for intrafamily violence.228 Moreover, before the Violence Against
Women Act, virtually all the legal reforms relating to violence against women
took place at the state level. In keeping with the federal courts' general
reluctance to take on issues concerning women and the family, the issue of
gender-motivated violence remained largely invisible in federal law.22 9
Like the division between the market and the family, the division between
the state and civil society may have weakened, but it certainly did not disappear.
To the present day, the state action doctrine is a controlling principle in much of
federal constitutional and civil rights law.230 As discussed earlier, the fact that
most constitutional and civil rights guarantees are protected only against
government interference renders them virtually useless as a source of redress for
violence against women. Even in the rare instances in which state actors have
played an identifiable role in facilitating intrafamily violence, the state action
doctrine can act as an obstacle to achieving legal redress. 231
The evolution of the two versions of the public-private split in the years
leading up to the introduction of the Violence Against Women Act is a story of
erosion and endurance. Although their hold on the law had unquestionably
loosened, both dichotomies continued to exercise substantial influence.
Significantly, as the preceding discussion has shown, the impact of the two
versions of the public-private split remained particularly apparent in the law
concerning violence against women, and especially in the absence of a federal
remedy for gender-motivated violence. Why was the lingering pull of the public-
private split so deeply felt in this area of law? The explanation lies in the fact that
violence against women is classified as private under both the market-family
Home; What Do You Mean That's Not a Crime?, 48 S.C. L. REV. 641 (1997).
228 See supra note 100.
229 Violence based on gender is omitted from two major federal statutes addressing
discriminatory violence generally: 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1994) and the Hate Crimes Statistics Act,
28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994). See generally Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence:
Developing a Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN's L.J.
123 (1999).
2 3 0 See MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 54, at 164.
The Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes that the Court has interpreted as applying to private
action either do not apply to gender discrimination at all, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1982, or have proven to be of little use in combating gender discrimination, see, e.g., Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (denying cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) for interference with abortion providers and patients).
231 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(holding that a county social service agency's failure to protect a child from being beaten by his
father did not constitute state action under the Due Process Clause, despite the agency's
assumption of responsibility to monitor family for abuse).
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dichotomy and the state-civil dichotomy. These two ways of classifying the
world, though each was somewhat weakened by legal reform, continued to pack
considerable strength when combined. Moreover, with respect to federal law-
which has adhered even more zealously than state law to the dictates of the
public-private dichotomies-violence against women is not merely doubly
disadvantaged but is triply disadvantaged: It falls on the private side of the
division between the market and family and between the state and civil society,
and it also falls on the wrong side of the divide between federal and state law.
These overlapping definitions of privacy, working in combination, generated
powerful resistance to the inclusion of gender-motivated violence in federal civil
rights law.
The synergistic effect of the two versions of the public-private split can be
seen by comparing the Violence Against Women Act-a late and highly
controversial 232 addition to the United States Code-to earlier federal civil rights
remedies for sex discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,233
which prohibits sex discrimination in employment and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972,234 which prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded
education programs, both create legal claims against nongovernmental actors.
These claims fall on the private side of the distinction between the public state
and private civil society. However, they fall on the public side of the distinction
between the market and the family, because both employment and education
take place in the public setting of the marketplace. Because such claims run afoul
of only one version of the public-private split they faced comparatively little
resistance and became an accepted part of federal civil rights law long before the
Violence Against Women Act.
The most controversial type of claim under Title VII and Title IX, namely
sexual harassment, has been problematic precisely because it is subject to the
perception that it implicates the private side of both versions of the public-private
split. Traditionally, anything to do with sexuality has been seen as belonging to
the private, domestic sphere because it concerns intimate, personal
relationships. 235 Catharine MacKinnon's groundbreaking book establishing
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination specifically rebutted this
view.236 MacKinnon's analysis demonstrated that sexual harassment entails
economic as well as sexual exploitation and therefore can properly be classified
2 32 See generally infra Part IV.
233 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
2 34 20 US.C. § 1681 (1994).
2 35 See generally Sally F. Goldfarb, Public Rights for 'Private ' Wrongs: Sexual
Harassment and the Violence Against Women Act (1999) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the author).
236 See generally MACKINNON, supra note 68.
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as belonging to the public, market sphere.237 When the Supreme Court upheld
causes of action for sexual harassment under Title Vi 3 8 and Title X,2 3
9 it
recognized that a sexual assault by a nongovernmental actor could constitute sex
discrimination. What it did not do, however, was to recognize that such an
assault could constitute sex discrimination if it took place in the domestic sphere
rather than a market setting.
That task fell to the Violence Against Women Act. The Violence Against
Women Act's civil rights provision was needed because most acts of violence
against women had never been actionable under federal civil rights law unless
they were committed by a state actor and/or took place in a market setting.
However, the fact that VAWA would extend the reach of federal civil rights law
to cover acts committed by private actors in the domestic sphere is exactly why it
met such vigorous opposition. As the following section will show, much of the
debate over VAWA while it was pending in Congress was framed in terms of the
two traditional versions of the public-private split
IV. THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMIES IN THE DEBATE
OVER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
For much of the four years that the Violence Against Women Act was under
consideration in Congress, the civil rights provision was the subject of heated
controversy.240 Both supporters and opponents of the provision agreed that
creating a federal civil right to be free from acts of gender-motivated violence
committed by private individuals would be a groundbreaking change in federal
civil rights law.241 Supporters and opponents disagreed, however, on whether
this change was justified. Much of the debate over VAWA's civil rights
provision took place in the language of the public and private spheres. The battle
over the civil rights remedy was largely a contest over the continuing vitality of
2 37 See id.
2 38 See generally Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
2 39 See generally Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
24 0 On VAWA's legislative history, see generally Goldfarb, supra note 12; Nourse, supra
note 12.
241 See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 78 (reprinting a letter dated Nov. 16,
1993, from Lyle Reid, Chief Justice of Tennessee, on behalf of the Conference of Chief
Justices, to Don Edwards, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, stating that VAWA's civil
rights provision 'represents a major change in civil rights law"); Naflali BenDavid, The
Surprising Volatility of the Violence Against Women Act, LEGAL TIMES, June 20, 1994, at 16
(quoting Senator Joseph Biden, Jr., who stated, "It's revolutionary. It's a fumdamental departure
from how we've dealt with empowering women:). Senator Biden was the bill's primary
legislative sponsor. See Goldfarb, supra note 12, at 394.
2000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
the market-family and state-civil society distinctions, and their attendant
assumptions about privacy, gender, and law.
A. Rhetoric ofPublic and Private Among Supporters of VA WA242
Supporters of VAWA faced the challenge of overcoming longstanding
boundaries between public and private that had placed violence against women
beyond the reach of federal civil rights law.
The Act in general, and the civil rights provision in particular, were designed
to counteract the view, implicit in the market-family distinction, that domestic
violence (and by extension, other forms of violence against women) are
"private" and therefore do not deserve legal redress. The first report on the
legislation by the Senate Judiciary Committee described its purpose as bringing
domestic violence out from "behind closed doors. '243 In its report a year later,
the Committee stated:
Historically, crimes against women have been perceived as anything but
crime-as a "family" problem, as a "private" matter, as sexual
miscommunication .... Vast numbers of these crimes [rape and domestic
violence] are left unreported to police or other authorities. Both literally and
figuratively, these crimes remain hidden from public view.244
A House of Representatives subcommittee hearing on the bill was entitled
"Domestic Violence: Not Just a Family Matter." 245 Similar themes were
sounded by the bill's co-sponsors and by witnesses who testified in support of
the legislation.246
242 In this context, the terms "supporters" and "opponents" refer to Members of Congress
as well as to individuals and organizations who testified or lobbied on the legislation.
243 See S. REp. No. 101-545 at 36 (1990) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Domestic
Violence: Not Just a Family Matter, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Criminal
Justice of the House of Reps. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 35-36 (1994) [hereinafter
1994 House Hearing] (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., stating that "[flor too long,
violence in the home has not been treated as seriously as violence in the street. ... Many in the
criminal justice system are reluctant to become involved in what they regard as a 'family
matter.").
244 See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 37-38 (1991); see also, e.g., Women and Violence:
Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong., pt. 1, 110 (1990) [hereinafter 1990
Senate Hearing] (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., commenting that "I want to make sure
that we no longer subscribe as a nation to the idea that sexual assaults that are gender-based
and, in fact, the most virulent expression of bias against women in our society should be
hidden").
245 See generally 1994 House Hearing, supra note 243.
246 See, e.g., Violence Against Women: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime &
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Proponents of the legislation directly attacked the legal legacy of the market-
family dichotomy as reflected in state law.247 For example, in congressional
testimony supporting the legislation, the NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund (NOW LDEF) argued that federal intervention was necessary in light of
trends in the state courts that denied justice to victims of domestic violence and
rape. Among the trends cited by NOW LDEF were judges who trivialized
domestic violence with comments like "Let's kiss and make up and get out of
my court"; criminal court judges who denied relief for domestic violence on the
ground that it is "merely a domestic problem that belongs in family court"; rape
immunities for husbands, cohabitants, and social companions; interspousal and
parental tort immunity doctrines; the unwillingness of police to enforce orders of
protection; and judicial reluctance to take nonstranger rape seriously.2 48 As we
Criminal Justice of the House of Reps. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 2 (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 House Hearing] (statement of Chairman Charles E. Schumer, stating that
"[t]he rule of thumb now is that domestic violence cases are nothing but lovers' quarrels that
are best left to be resolved without the police and the courts.); id. at 4 (statement of Rep.
George E. Sangmeister, stating that "I want you to know that I support... the Violence
Against Women Act.... We must work to change the perception that domestic violence is a
family matter."); id. at 17 (statement of Rep. Barbara Boxer, stating that "[i]t is time that we, as
a society, change our perception of domestic violence which encourages people to view it as
private and insignificant."); id. at 24 (statement of Rep. Constance Morella, stating that "[a]
problem that in the past was swept under the carpet, domestic violence is now a national
disgrace of critical proportion."); id. at 58 (statement of Jane Doe, recounting an episode of
violent abuse by her husband after which police officer told her to "go back in the house and
work everything out'); id. at 61 (statement of William F. Schenck, county prosecutor, Greene
County, Ohio, appearing on behalf of the National Organization for Victim Assistance,
commenting that "we... face.., the persistent myth that a man's home is his castle"); id. at 70
(statement of Margaret Rosenbaum, Assistant State Attorney, Miami, Fl, commenting that
"many [police] officers consider domestic violence to be a private matter, something other than
real crime").
247 See, e.g., SEN. REp. No. 102-197, at 45 (1991) (criticizing state laws on parental
immunity, interspousal tort immunity, and partial and complete marital rape exemptions).
24 8 See 1990 Senate Hearing, supra note 244, at 64-67 (statement of Helen R. Neubome,
Executive Director, NOW Legal Defense Fund and Education Fund); see also 1993 House
Hearing, supra note 66, at 8-9 (statement of Sally Goldfarb, Senior Staff Attorney, NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund). An example cited in NOW LDEF's testimony involved a
New York case in which a masked stranger broke into a woman's apartment and raped her in
her bed. Explaining his intention to impose a minimal sentence, the judge in the case stated, 'I
think it started without consent, but maybe they ended up enjoying themselves .... It was not
like a rape on the street. ... People hear rape and they think of the poor girl in the park dragged
into the bushes. But it wasn't like that." 1990 Senate Hearing, supra note 244, at 66 (citing In
re Judge John J. Fromer, Determination of the New York State Commission on Judicial
Conduct, Oct. 25, 1984, at 2). This judge apparently classified the act of rape as a domestic
relationship, and therefore as private and less serious, simply because it took place in the
victim's bed rather than on the street.
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have seen, all of these trends are traceable to the split between market and family
and the concomitant assumption that the law should not interfere in the domestic
sphere.
VAWA's supporters also attempted to counter the view that violence against
women is purely a domestic matter by proving the massive effects of such
violence on interstate commerce. The Senate Judiciary Committee noted that
domestic violence alone is estimated to cost society between five and ten billion
dollars a year.2 4 9 Congress heard extensive testimony on the effect of violence
on women's workforce participation and productivity, income, health care
expenses, consumer spending, and interstate travel.250 Based on the evidence
before it, the Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that gender-based violence
bars women from full participation in the national economy.251 According to the
Committee, the experience of gender-based violence interferes with women's
ability to obtain and keep employment, travel, and engage in other economic
activities, and the fear of gender-motivated violence has a deterrent effect that
prevents women from taking available, well-paying jobs.2 52
In addition to helping establish Congress's constitutional authority to enact
the civil rights provision under the Commerce Clause,253 this economic evidence
24 9 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993).
250 See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 40-41, 43 (statement of Professor
Burt Neubome, New York University School of Law); id. at 5, 13 (statement of Sally
Goldfarb, Senior Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund); Women anid
Violence: Victims of the System, Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong. 92-
93, 95 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Senate Hearing] (statement of Professor Burt Neubome, New
York University School of Law); id. at 239-43 (statement of Elizabeth Athanasakos, President,
National Federation of Business and Professional Women, Inc.); 1990 Senate Hearing, supra
note 244, at 68-69 (statement of Helen Neubome, Executive Director, NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund).
251 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 53 (1991).
252 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 53 (1991).
253 Based on evidence of the economic effects of gender-motivated violence, legal
experts testified before Congress that the civil rights provision was a valid exercise of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at
43-45 (statement of Professor Burt Neubome, New York University School of Law); id. at 57-
61 (statement of Professor Cass Sunstein, University of Chicago Law School); 1991 Senate
Hearing, supra note 250, at 95-97 (statement of Professor Burt Neubome, New York
University School of Law); id. at 113-17 (statement of Professor Cass Sunstein, University of
Chicago Law School). In the Conference Committee report that Congress adopted when it
passed the Violence Against Women Act, Congress found that:
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was a direct challenge to the conventional view that domestic matters, including
domestic violence, have no impact on the public sphere of the marketplace. By
indicating that violence against women has a prominent place in the market,
VAWA's supporters sought to show that violence against women also deserves
to have a prominent place in the law.
In another indication of the relevance of the market-family split to the debate
over VAWA, the bill's supporters repeatedly emphasized that the civil rights
provision would not create a federal domestic relations law.2 54 This strategy was
necessitated by two ways in which the market-family dichotomy is reflected in
federal law: first, the federal judiciary's staunch resistance to hearing family-
related cases, and second, the tendency to assume that all cases concerning
women are really about the family.25 5
Another way in which supporters of the civil rights remedy positioned
violence against women as a public issue was by emphasizing that gender-
motivated violence is a group-based denial of equality.256 Patricia Ireland,
president of the National Organization for Women, testified:
[qrimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate
commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in
employment in interstate business, and from transacting... business ... in interstate
commerce; crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on
interstate commerce, by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other
costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994). For further discussion of Congress's authority to
enact VAWA's civil rights provision under the Commerce Clause, see infra Parts V.A, V.B.2.
254 See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 104-05 (statement of James P.
Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice);
1992 House Hearing, supra note 246, at 10 (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.); S. REP.
No. 102-197, at 48 (1991). The Violence Against Women Act specifies that it does not confer
federal jurisdiction over any state law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony,
marital property, or child custody decree. See 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(e)(4) (1994).
255 See generally supra Part IIIA.4, and infra Part IV.B.
256 See, e.g., 1994 House Hearing, supra note 243, at 39 (statement of Sen. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., stating that "[o]nly when this violence is seen as a public injustice, rather than a
private misfortune, will we truly begin to confront this problem."); 1990 Senate Hearing, supra
note 244, at 2 (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., describing gender-motivated violence as
"violent sexisnm' and analogizing it to sex discrimination in employment); S. REP. No. 102-
197, at 35 (1991) (noting that "the bill declares-for the first time-that gender-motivated
crimes are a violation of the victim's civil rights, a proposal that sends a powerful message
condemning crimes that not only ravage individuals but systematically deprive women of
equal rights under law").
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It's very clear to all of us who see the bombings of NAACP offices, the
vandalizing of synagogues, that these are more clearly political and public
violence. But because so much of the violence against women is behind closed
doors, is ... private violence,... the political aspect of it has often been ignored.
It's not just a problem that an individual woman faces... but rather a systemic
problem that all women face.257
Echoing this analysis, the Senate Judiciary Committee described violence
motivated by gender as "not merely an individual crime or a personal injury,
but.., a form of discrimination," "an assault on a publicly shared ideal of
equality. '258 The Committee characterized the civil rights provision as "an
effective anti-discrimination remedy for violently expressed prejudice." 259
In addition to highlighting The discriminatory impact of individual acts of
gender-motivated violence, the bill's supporters also emphasized the
discrimination inherent in the state legal systems' responses to such violence.
Testimony of individual witnesses and committee reports repeatedly stressed the
fact that states have condoned violence against women through legal doctrines
that treat crimes against women less seriously than crimes against men; through
inadequate enforcement of existing laws by police, prosecutors, and judges; and
through overtly discriminatory treatment of female crime victims.2 60 Thus, the
bill's supporters identified causes of violence against women in the public sphere
of the state, not merely in the private sphere of civil society. After reviewing a
257 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 114 (statement of Patricia Ireland, President,
National Organization for Women); see also 1990 Senate Hearing, supra note 244, at 62
(statement of Helen Neubome, Executive Director, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund,
stating that "[b]ecause of gender-based violence, American women and girls are relegated to a
form of second-class citizenship").
258 S. REP. No. 101-545, at 40, 43 (1990) (quoting statement of Helen Neubome). In
keeping with its emphasis on the discriminatory aspect of violence against women, VAWA's
civil rights remedy does not cover all crimes committed against women; rather, it requires
proof of gender motivation in each case. See generally infra Part IV.C.
259 See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 42 (1991). A number of witnesses and committee reports
analogized gender-based attacks to hate crimes based on race or religion. See, e.g., 1993 House
Hearing, supra note 67, at 113 (statement of Patricia Ireland, President, National Organization
for Women); 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 250, at 48-49 (statement of Sen. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr.); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 48-49 (1993); S. REP NO. 101-545, at 41 (1990).
260 See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 8-9 (statement of Sally Goldfarb,
Senior Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49
(1993); H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27-28 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 33-35, 43-48
(1991); S. REP. No. 101-545, at 41 (1990); see also S. REP. No. 103-138, at 55 (1993) (quoting
statement of Professor Cass Sunstein, University of Chicago Law School, stating that "the




series of reports from official state task forces on gender bias in the courts, the
Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that there was "overwhelming evidence
that gender bias permeates the court system and that women are most often its
victims. 2 6 1
The legal implications of identifying violence against women as an issue of
public equality, rather than a private, individual injury, are significant. Legal
experts testified before Congress that the failure of state law to provide effective
legal remedies for violence against women, together with overt gender bias in the
state justice systems, provided a valid basis for Congress to enact the civil rights
remedy under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 62 By designating
gender-motivated violence as a form of discrimination, VAWA's supporters
were able to present the civil rights remedy as an antidiscrimination measure that
builds on, and is a logical extension of, existing federal civil rights laws.263
B. Rhetoric ofPublic and Private Among Opponents of VA WA
While VAWA was pending in Congress, much of the opposition to the civil
rights provision was premised on a group of attitudes associated with orthodox
adherence to the public-private distinctions: the idealization of family privacy
and legal nonintervention in the family; the tendency to equate women with the
domestic sphere; the belief that matters involving the family belong only in state
court; and resistance to the recent trend of applying federal constitutional and
261 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49 (1993) (quoting Lynn Hecht Schafran, Overwhelming
Evidence: Reports on Gender Bias in the Courts, TRIAL, Feb. 1990, at 28).
262 See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 45-47 (statement of Professor Burt
Neubome, New York University School of Lav); id. at 61-67 (statement of Professor Cass
Sunstein, University of Chicago Lav School); 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 250, at 97-99
(statement of Professor Burt Neubome, New York University School of Law); id. at 117-23
(statement of Professor Cass Sunstein, University of Chicago Law School). For further
discussion of Congress's authority to enact VAWA's civil rights provision under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra Parts VA, V.B.3.
263 See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 10-11 (statement of Sally Goldfarb,
Senior Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, stating that VAWA "builds
on and complements existing federal civil rights laws"); id. at 98, 105 (statement of James P.
Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
stating that VAWA "builds on the foundation laid by existing civil rights laws"); H.IR. CONF.
REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (noting that "current law provides a civil rights remedy for
gender crimes committed in the workplace, but not for crimes of violence motivated by gender
committed on the street or in the home"); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 51-53 (1993) (stating that
VAWA's civil rights remedy is "a logical extension" of the nation's 120-year history of using
federal civil rights laws to fight discriminatory violence, and that VAWA's "definition of
gender-motivated crime is based on title VIP"); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 62 (1991) (noting that
the civil rights provision is "[m]odeled on [42 U.S.C.] sections 1981, 1983, and 1985(3)").
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civil rights to nonstate actors. The clearest expressions of these attitudes came
from the judiciary, who lobbied actively against the bill. An examination of
statements made by VAWA's opponents reveals the lingering influence of
traditional conceptions of public and private.
In a particularly striking evocation of the ideology of legal nonintervention
in the family, the Conference of Chief Justices, which represents the state
judiciary, criticized VAWA's civil rights provision on the ground that it would
conflict with the marital rape exemption.2 64 Similarly, lawyer Bruce Fein, who
testified against the legislation, specifically objected to the fact that VAWA
would interfere with a state's choice not to criminalize spousal rape-a choice
that, according to Fein, states should be free to make based on "local
customs. 2 65 Although the marital rape exemption survives, 266 it is rare to see it
openly defended;267 the fact that VAWA's opponents did so reveals the depth of
their immersion in the world view of the market-family split.
Much of the opposition to the civil rights provision took the form of
assertions that federal courts should not interfere in the private, domestic
sphere.268 Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example, used his 1991 Year-End Report
on the Federal Judiciary to urge Congress not to pass the Violence Against
Women Act because it would create an influx of "domestic relations disputes"
into the federal courts.2 69 Similarly, the Conference of Chief Justices opposed
the statute on the basis that it would constitute an unwarranted federal intrusion
into the domain of the state courts. 270 Like its state counterpart, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, representing the federal judiciary, adopted a
264 See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 81 (statement by The Honorable Vincent
L. McKusick, President, Conference of Chief Justices, citing 18 U.S.C. § 2243(c)(2) (1994)
(establishing marriage as a defense to federal crime of sexual abuse of ninor or ward)); 1991
Senate Hearing, supra note 250, at 316 (same).
265 See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 27-28 (statement of Bruce Fein, attorney).
266 See supra note 100.
267 See Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the
Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 217-20 (1995) (claiming that privacy doctrine has not been
used by modem courts to defend marital rape).
268 See Nourse, supra note 12, at 13 ("[S]tate and federal judges mounted a campaign to
wain that the bill would 'flood the federal courts' and deprive state courts of their traditional
jurisdiction.').
269 William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, THETHImD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 1, 3 [hereinaiter 1991 Year-End Report]; see also
William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Conference on State-Federal Judicial
Relationships, 78 VA. L. REv. 1657, 1660 (1992) (criticizing VAWA for potential to "create
needless friction and duplication among the state and federal systems").
270 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 83-84 (statement of The Honorable Vincent
L. McKusick, President, Conference of Chief Justices).
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resolution in 1991 opposing VAWA's civil rights provision because of "its
potential to disrupt traditional jurisdictional boundaries between the federal and
state courts.1 271
Implicit in these objections are the familiar assumptions that all violence
against women is "domestic" and that domestic issues do not belong in federal
court.272 In fact, VAWA's scope encompasses any "crime of violence motivated
by gender"; the fact that an act of violence took place in the home or among
family members is neither necessary nor sufficient to make out a cause of
action. 273 Viewed objectively, VAWA is not a domestic relations law. It
explicitly does not confer pendent jurisdiction over state law claims seeking
establishment of divorce, alimony, marital property, and custody decrees.274
VAWA is a civil rights law, modeled on other federal civil laws.2 75 Inasmuch as
VAWA is designed to remedy discrimination-whether it takes place in the
family or elsewhere-it appropriately belongs in federal court, the traditional
forum for civil rights relief.276
Both the Conference of Chief Justices and the Judicial Conference of the
United States expressed concern that women would use VAWA as a bargaining
chip to extort larger settlements in divorces.277 The President of the Conference
271 See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 70 (letter from Judge Stanley Marcus on
behalf of the Judicial Conference to Don Edwards, Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights). Unlike the Conference of Chief Justices and the Judicial Conference of
the United States, the National Association of Women Judges endorsed VAWA, including the
civil rights provision. See id. at 30-32. In addition, 41 state attorneys general signed a letter
endorsing VAWA, including its civil rights provision, and calling for "federal leadership" on
the issue of violence against women. See id. at 34-36; see also 1991 Senate Hearing, supra
note 250, at 37-38 (reprinting unanimous resolution of National Association of Attorneys
General endorsing VAWA, including its civil rights title).
272 See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 83 (statement of The Honorable
Vincent L. McKusick, President, Conference of Chief Justices, stating that "spousal and sexual
violence and all legal issues involved in domestic relations historically have been governed by
state criminal and civil law"); Letter from The Honorable Vincent L. McCusick, President
Conference of Chief Justices, to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 2 (Feb. 22, 1991) (on file with the
author) (describing the civil sights provision as a "direct federal intervention into the tangled
and tragic cases involving family breakdown and violence").
273 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
274 See42 U.S.C. § 13981(eX4) (1994).
275 See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
2 76 See Letter from Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., to Delegates of the American Bar
Association 1 (Aug. 10, 1992) (unpublished document on file with the author) (arguing that
VAWA does not .'federalize[ ]' state law claims" any more than existing federal remedies for
lynchings, race-based bombings of churches, or murders of civil rights workers).
2 77 See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 75, 80. To this argument, Senator Biden
responded, "It is outrageous to assume that women as a group are prone to file frivolous
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of Chief Justices complained that VAWA "would add a new count to many if not
most divorce and other domestic relations cases, further complicating their
adjudication and making them more difficult to settle peacefully."2 78 This
emphasis on "peaceful[ ]" settlement of domestic relations cases echoes
nineteenth-century cases arguing against judicial intrusion in the marriage
relationship. 279 Settlement like mediation, is a way to keep family disputes out
of court even when legal recourse is technically available.
In addition to raising arguments based on the split between market and
family and corresponding assumptions about federal and state jurisdiction, the
Conference of Chief Justices also invoked the split between the state and civil
society. The Conference objected that VAWA's civil rights provision "appears to
eliminate, or at least vitiate, the 'state action' requirement for civil rights
litigation. '280 Because VAWA's scope is not limited to actions taken under color
of state law, the Conference argued, it is inconsistent with existing federal civil
rights laws.2 81 In other words, civil rights statutes can protect private individuals
only from the state, not from each other. As noted earlier, the preceding three
decades had seen a proliferation of federal cases and statutes prohibiting
discrimination by private actors. 282 The fact that the organization representing
the leading state jurists in the country argued repeatedly and forcefully that
federal civil rights laws apply exclusively to state actors, without acknowledging
the growing number of exceptions to that general rule, demonstrates the lingering
power of the state-civil society dichotomy over the judicial imagination.
C. The Outcome of the Debate: The Significance ofEnactment of the
Violence Against Women Act
Ultimately, the Judicial Conference of the United States was satisfied with
the inclusion of language limiting the scope of VAWA's civil rights remedy and
withdrew its opposition to the legislation, adopting a position of neutrality
suits .... The suggestion that [they do so] plays upon the very gender-biased stereotypes that
my legislation was intended, in part, to dispel." Letter from Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. to
Delegates of the American Bar Association, supra note 276, at 2.
278 Letter from The Honorable Vincent L. McCusick, President, Conference of Chief
Justices, to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., supra note 272, at 1.
2 79 See supra Part IIIA.2.
280 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 82 (statement by The Honorable Vincent L.
McCusick, President, Conference of Chief Justices) (emphasis omitted); 1991 Senate Hearing,
supra note 250, at 317 (same).
281 See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 78.
2 82 See supra Part mI.C; see also 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 45-47
(statement of Professor Burt Neubome, New York University School of Law).
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instead.283 In 1994, the Violence Against Women Act, including the civil rights
remedy, was passed by Congress and signed into law.284
The Violence Against Women Act declares for the first time that a "crime of
violence motivated by gender" is discriminatory and violates the victim's civil
rights under federal law.285 The statute defines the phrase "motivated by gender"
as an act committed "because of gender or on the basis of gender and due, at
least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender."286 The term "crime of
violence" includes acts that federal or state law would consider a felony against a
person, or a felony against property that presents a serious risk of physical injury
to another person.287 The definition of "crime of violence" also includes acts that
would constitute such a felony but for the relationship between the perpetrator
and the victirn.2 88 Although the legislative history of the civil rights provision
focused primarily on stranger and nonstranger rape, domestic violence, and
murder of women, the statute is gender neutral and permits a suit against the
perpetrator of any "crime of violence motivated by gender" as defined in the Act.
VAWA's civil rights provision creates a private, civil right of action and allows
awards of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief,
and attorney's fees.289 The plaintiff is not required to press criminal charges or
obtain a criminal conviction in order to pursue the civil rights remedy against the
perpetrator.290
The passage of this legislation had great practical and symbolic value. On a
practical level, VAWA offers a remedy that in some cases is the only source of
legal redress for violence against women and in many others is vastly superior to
other available legal options. VAWA avoids the restrictive effects of state tort
2 83 See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 37, 70-73. Among the changes to the
statute that were cited approvingly by the Judicial Conference were a requirement of proof of
animus; restrictions on the types of crimes covered; denial of supplemental federal jurisdiction
over state law claims seeking establishment of divorce, alimony, marital property, or child
custody decrees; and a prohibition on removal to federal court of any VAWA civil rights action
filed in state court. See id. at 71. The Conference of Chief Justices maintained its opposition to
the civil rights remedy. See id. at 77-84.
284 See Nourse, supra note 12, at 33-36.
285 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994).
286 42 U.S.C. § 13981(dX1) (1994). For discussion of applications of the "motivated by
gender" standard, see generally Goldfarb, supra note 12, at 397-98; Goldscheid, supra note
68; Nourse, supra note 12, at 29-33.
287 42 U.S.C. § 13981(dX2XA) (1994).
288 42 U.S.C. § 13981(dX2)(B) (1994).
289 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997).
290 42 U.S.C. § 13981(eX2) (1994).
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immunities, marital rape exemptions, and unduly short statutes of limitations.291
Unlike most previous federal civil rights laws, VAWA does not require a
showing of action taken under color of state law292 or proof of a conspiracy to
deny the plaintiff an independent, federally protected right.2 93 VAWA civil
rights claims brought in federal Court 2 94 are covered by Rule 412 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence which, as amended elsewhere in VAWA, extends rape shield
protections to civil cases;295 few states offer such protections.296 For cases of
gender-motivated violence in the workplace, VAWA provides a desirable
alternative to Title VII because it permits unlimited awards of compensatory and
punitive damages; has a far longer statute of limitations; does not require
exhaustion of administrative remedies; and applies to workplaces with fewer
than fifteen employees.297 As a civil rather than criminal action, VAWA
empowers women by placing control over the litigation in their own hands and
sidesteps the obstacles of gender bias among police and prosecutors. Also, unlike
criminal cases, VAWA permits plaintiffs to collect money damages and applies
the preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the more onerous
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.298
291 See 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1994) (establishing a four year federal statute of limitations);
see also Grace v. Nissan, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090 (D. Or. 1999) (applying a four year statute
of limitations). Some federal courts have erroneously applied state statutes of limitations to
VAWA civil rights claims. See generally Santiago v. Alonso, 66 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.P.R.
1999); Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Kan. 1999); Ericson v.
Syracuse Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
2 92 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
293 See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994). Unlike section 1985(3), which merely prohibits
interference with existing federal rights (most of which require a showing of state action),
VAWA creates a new, substantive federal right to be free from gender-motivated violence and
applies that right equally to violence committed by state actors and private actors. See 1993
House Hearing, supra note 67, at 46-47 (statement of Professor Burt Neubome, New York
University School of Law, distinguishing VAWA from section 1985(3)); S. REP. No. 103-138,
at 64 (1993) (stating that civil rights remedy applies equally to state and private action).
294 The federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over VAWA civil rights
claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(3) (1994). For plaintiffs, federal courts may offer a variety of
advantages stemming from differing judicial selection techniques, insulation from political
pressure, and superior resources. See generally Burt Neubome, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a
Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797 (1995).
295 Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 40141, 108 Stat. 1918 (1994)
(codified at FED. R. EVID. 412).
2 9 6 See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 46 (1991).
297 See generally Andrea Brenneke, Title VII, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND
LmGATON 18-1 to 18-35 (David Frazee et al. eds., 1997).
298 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 13981(c), (e)(1) (1994).
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On a symbolic level, VAWA was a major victory for women's equality299
and seemed to displace rigid conceptions of privacy that had for so long hidden
violence against women from public recognition and public response. A federal
civil rights remedy places the issue of violence against women squarely in the
domain of public law rather than relegating it to private law remedies or no legal
remedies at all. Notably, VAWA's challenge to traditional distinctions between
public and private was applauded by a range of feminist writers whose views on
privacy otherwise differ profoundly, from those who have emphasized the
negative impact of privacy ideology on women3°° to those who have celebrated
privacy as a potential source of freedom and autonomy for women.30 1 If indeed
the public-private distinction is what the feminist movement is all about,3
02 it
would seem that the enactment of VAWA's civil rights remedy advanced the
movement's agenda significantly.
Not surprisingly, however, the battle over the issue of privacy did not end
with VAWA's passage. Although the legislation had been narrowed sufficiently
to allow the federal judges to withdraw their opposition, their concerns had not
disappeared. There was still the danger that despite VAWA's successful journey
through the legislative process, the judiciary's privacy-based opposition would
reassert itself in interpretations of the statute.303 As the following Part will show,
the constitutional litigation over the Violence Against Women Act proves that
judicial allegiance to the public-private distinction in both its forms threatens the
survival of VAWA's civil rights remedy for gender-motivated violence.
V. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMIES REVISITED: CoNSTuToNAL
CHALLENGES To TE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
The civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act is predicated
on the insight that acts of gender-motivated violence are not purely private harms
to individual women, but are matters of public concern. Indeed, Congress's
assertion of jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
2 99 See, e.g., S. REp. No. 102-197, at 85-86 (1991) (statement of Professor Burt
Neubome, New York University School of Law, stating that labeling gender-motivated
violence as a civil rights violation is a niajor step forward for women's equality); Cass R.
Sunstein, Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s: Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV.
751,772 n.64 (1991) (describing VAWA as "[ain excellent example of anti-caste legislation").
300 See, e.g., WEsT, supra note 57, at 302-03; MacKinnon, supra note 60, at 1308 n.125;
Siegel, supra note 76, at 2196-2206.
301 See, e.g., McClain, Reconstructive Tasks, supra note 215, at 779; Schneider, supra
note 10, at 56 n.10.
302 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
303 See Siegel, supra note 76, at 2200-06.
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Amendment constitutes a recognition that violence against women affects the
public sphere in both senses of that term-the market and the state,
respectively.30 4 But the long history of viewing domestic violence, rape, and
other crimes against women as private matters dictated that VAWA would meet
with resistance in the courts, as it had in Congress.
Since VAWA was enacted in 1994, plaintiffs have brought claims under the
new statute in lawsuits alleging various types of gender-motivated violence,
including rape, sexual assault, nonsexual assault, sexual abuse of minors, wife-
battering, and murder.305 In response to these claims, a growing number of
defendants have challenged the constitutionality of VAWA's civil rights
provision.306 They argue that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact a
304See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994) (stating that the civil rights provision is enacted
"[p]ursuant to the affirmative power of Congress ... under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution').
305 See generally, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d
820 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. grantedsub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999)
(alleging gang rape by fellow students in university dormitory); Williams v. Board of County
Comm'rs, No. 98-2485-JTM, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13532 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1999) (alleging
rape by police officer); Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98-C-2395, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11010 (N.D. Ill.
July 15, 1999) (alleging physical and sexual violence by husband); Bergeron v. Bergeron, 48
F. Supp. 2d 628 (M.D. La. 1999) (alleging battery, assault, and attempted rape by husband);
Wright v. Wright, No. Civ. 98-572-A (W.D. Okla. Apr. 27, 1999) (alleging physical violence
by defendant against wife and daughter); Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (alleging sexual harassment by university tennis coach); Culberson v. Doan,
65 F. Supp. 2d 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (alleging that defendant beat and murdered girlfriend);
Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass.), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub
nom. Doe v. Walker, 193 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 1999) (alleging gang rape); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F.
Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999) (alleging sexual harassment and rape by university adviser);
Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (alleging assault, threats, and
harassment by husband); Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, No. 98-1550-Civ-Highsmith (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 27, 1998) (alleging sexual harassment and sexual assault by employment supervisor);
C.R.K. v. Martin, No. 96-1431-MLB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22305 (D. Kan. July 10, 1998)
(alleging rape and threats of physical violence by fellow student at plaintiffs high school);
Timm v. DeLong, 59 F. Supp. 2d 944 (D. Neb. 1998) (alleging physical and sexual abuse by
husband); Mattison v. Click Corp. of Am., No. 97-CV-2736, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 720 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 27, 1998) (alleging sexual assault, battery, and harassment by employer); Crisonino v.
N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (alleging nonsexual, gender-
motivated assault by employment supervisor); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ili.
1997) (alleging assault, harassment, and rape by employer); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp.
1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (alleging physical and sexual abuse by husband); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F.
Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'don other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998) (alleging
sexual abuse by priest); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (alleging physical and
mental abuse by husband).
306 See supra cases cited in note 305.
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civil rights remedy for gender-motivated violence. As noted earlier, Congress
founded its authority to pass VAWA on both the Commerce Clause and section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and prominent professors of constitutional law
testified during hearings on VAWA that both of those sources provided Congress
with a valid constitutional basis for enacting the civil rights remedy.307
The constitutional challenges to VAWA attempt to revive the inflexible
distinctions between public and private that VAWA itself was designed to
transcend. First, the challenges claim that the civil rights provision is not a
legitimate exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power because violence
against women does not have sufficiently close ties to the market. Second, they
argue that Congress lacked authority to enact the civil rights remedy under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because violence against women does
not have sufficiently close ties to the state. These constitutional challenges, by
invoking the image of an irreconcilable division between family and market and
between civil society and the state, simply recapitulate the public-private split in
both its forms. Relying on the familiar public-private dichotomies, the
defendants bringing these challenges, and the judges who agree with them,
would isolate violence against women in the private sphere and thereby exclude
those injuries from federal civil rights relief. In addition, the litigants and judges
who embrace these arguments bring to bear a set of assumptions that, as we have
seen, arise naturally from rigid adherence to conventional rubrics of public and
private, such as the assumptions that women exist only in the domestic sphere
and that cases affecting the family belong exclusively in state courts. Their
arguments, in short, echo the judiciary's unsuccessful opposition to VAWA
during the legislative process.
The overwhelming majority of courts that have confronted these claims have
upheld the civil rights remedy as a legitimate exercise of Congress's legislative
powers under the Constitution. 30 8 However, in some cases, the claim that the
307 See supra Part IV.A. Other possible constitutional bases for the civil rights remedy
include the Thirteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 47-49 (statement of Professor Burt
Neubome, New York University School of Law). However, Congress did not claim authority
to pass the legislation under those constitutional provisions, and they have not been the focus
of the litigation over VAWA's constitutionality.
308 The following federal cases have found the civil rights remedy constitutional under
the Commerce Clause: Williams, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13532; Kuhn, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11010; Wright v. Wright, No. Civ. 98-572-A (W.D. Okla. Apr. 27, 1999); Ericson 45 F. Supp.
2d 344; Culberson, 65 F. Supp. 2d 701; Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64; Liu, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452;
Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601; Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, No. 98-1550-Civ-Highsmith (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 27, 1998); C.R.K, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22305; Timm, 59 F. Supp. 2d 944;
Mattison, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 720; Crisonino, 985 F. Supp. 385; Anisimov, 982 F. Supp.
531 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188; Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375; Doe, 929 F. Supp.
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civil rights remedy is unconstitutional has met with success. 309 In the only
constitutional challenge to VAWA's civil rights provision that has yet reached
the United States Court of Appeals, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute
& State University,310 the Fourth Circuit issued an en banc decision striking
down the provision as unconstitutional under both the Commerce Clause and
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. At this writing, that case is currently
before the United States Supreme Court.
The challenges to VAWA's constitutionality have been aided by two
Supreme Court decisions issued after VAWA was enacted: United States v.
Lopez,311 which construed the scope of the Commerce Clause, and City of
Boerne v. Flores,312 which did the same for section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, as the following discussion will show, VAWA's civil
rights remedy passes constitutional muster even in the wake of Lopez and
Boerne. Properly understood, both the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment provide ample constitutional authority for the civil rights
remedy in VAWA. As the Brzonkala case illustrates, the claim that VAWA is
unconstitutional derives most of its support not from Supreme Court precedent
but from traditional notions of privacy.
A. Cases Finding the Civil Rights Remedy Constitutional
To date, nineteen cases313 have upheld VAWA's civil rights remedy as a
legitimate exercise of Congress's constitutional power to "regulate
Commerce... among the several States." 314 A common theme in these opinions
is the need for judicial restraint when reviewing congressional action under the
Commerce Clause.315 As several of these courts pointed out 3 16 the independent
608. Wright v. Wright, supra, and Timm v. DeLong, supra, also found the civil rights remedy
constitutional under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, the following state
cases have upheld the constitutionality of the civil rights provision: Fisher v. Grimes, No. 98
CVD 865 (N.C. Dist. Ct. July 22, 1999); Young v. Johnson, No. CV 97-90014 (Ariz. Sup. Ct.
May 13, 1999) (written record of oral proceedings).
309 See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d 820; Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628.
310 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison,
120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
311 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
312 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
313 See supra cases cited in note 308.
314 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
315 See, e.g., Ericson, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 346-47; Culberson, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 707-08,
713-14; Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 68-70; Liu, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 477-78; Ziegler, 28 F. Supp.
2d at 608, 613; Timm, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 949-50; Crisonino, 985 F. Supp. at 395-96; Anisimov,
982 F. Supp. at 538-40.
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judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a statute enacted under the
Commerce Clause is limited to determining "whether a rational basis existed for
concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce,"
317
and if so, whether the means chosen by Congress are "reasonably adapted to the
end permitted by the Constitution." 318
In applying this test the courts upholding the civil rights remedy relied
heavily on VAWA's massive legislative history, which includes multiple
hearings and committee reports compiled over the course of more than four
years.319 The courts emphasized Congress's "extensive compilation of data,
testimony, and reports" 320 and the range of witnesses who testified on the
legislation, including state attorneys general, the United States Department of
Justice, prosecutors, law professors, judicial organizations, mental health experts,
physicians, legal advocacy groups, professional organizations, representatives of
domestic violence and rape crisis programs, and victims of violence.321 As one
court concluded, "Congress held numerous hearings over a four-year period and
amassed substantial documentation on how gender-based violence impacts
interstate commerce," and the resulting "statistical, medical, and economic data"
adequately demonstrated the rational basis for the conclusion that gender-based
violence has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.3
22
Based on the evidence it received, Congress made findings concerning the
impact of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce. These findings, in
turn, played a prominent role in decisions upholding the Act. For example, Doe
v. Doe, the first federal district court ruling on the constitutionality of the civil
rights remedy, quoted the following language from the Conference Report
adopted by Congress when it passed VAWA:
316 See, e.g., Ericson, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 346-47; Culberson, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 707-08,
713-14; Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 68-69; Liu, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 477; Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d
608, 613; Timm 59 F. Supp. 2d at 949-50; Crisonino, 985 F. Supp. at 395-96; Anisimov, 982
F. Supp. at 538-40; Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1188-89; Hartz, 970 F. Supp. at 1415, 1422-23;
Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 612-13. In their Commerce Clause analysis, these courts applied
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), which is
discussed fuirther infra in Part V.B.2.
317 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
3 18 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981) (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,262 (1964)).
319 See, e.g., Culberson, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 709 n.10; Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 609-11;
Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 611.
320 Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 614.
321 See Culberson, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 709; Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 609-10; Anisimov
928 F. Supp. at 537; Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 611.
322 Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 611,615. See also Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 611.
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[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on
interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate,
from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from... business... in
interstate commerce; crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial
adverse effect on interstate commerce, by diminishing national productivity,
increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand
for interstate products. 323
The Doe decision also quoted the following findings from the final Senate report
on the legislation:
Gender-based crimes and fear of gender-based crimes restricts movement
reduces employment opportnities, increases health expenditures, and reduces
consumer spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and the national
economy. Gender-based violence bars its most likely targets-women-from
full [participation] in the national economy. For example, studies report that
almost 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or are forced to quit in the
aftermath of the crime. Even the fear of gender-based violence affects the
economy because it deters women from taking jobs in certain areas or at certain
hours that pose a significant risk of such violence. 324
Other cases finding the civil rights remedy constitutional similarly relied on
Congress's "staggering 325 findings regarding the substantial effect of gender-
motivated violence on interstate commerce.32 6 As one court concluded, "[W]hen
one-half of the nation's population is potentially limited in employment,
traveling, and participation in commercial spending due to the threat of violence,
interstate commerce and the national economy are inevitably affected." 327
Having decided that the Commerce Clause gave Congress constitutional
authority to enact a civil rights remedy for gender-motivated violence, most of
these courts opted not to reach the question of whether section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment did so as well.328 However, two cases have proceeded to
323 Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 614 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994))
(brackets in original; ellipses added).
324 Id. at 613 (quoting S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993)) (brackets added).
32 5 Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1421 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd on other grounds,
134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998).
326 See, e.g., Wright v. Wright, No. Civ. 98-572-A at 3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 27, 1999);
Crisonino v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Hartz, 970 F.
Supp. at 1421-23.
327 Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1997).
328 See, e.g., Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 614 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Doe v. Doe,
929 F. Supp. at 617.
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consider whether Congress had an additional constitutional basis for enactment
of the civil rights provision under section 5, which grants Congress the "power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of' the Fourteenth
Amendment.329 Both cases concluded that VAWA's civil rights remedy falls
within the scope of Congress's power under section 5.330
Wright v. Wright found that "Supreme Court precedent supports Congress's
regulation of private conduct under Section 5" and characterized VAWA as a
permissible remedial statute designed to enforce the equal protection guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 31 The Wright opinion incorporated by reference
an earlier decision in the same case in which the court held that section 5
authorized Congress to regulate "purely private conduct," "even in the absence
of an identifiable Equal Protection violation."332 In the earlier opinion, the court
stated that "VAWA is clearly a constitutional exercise of Congress' Section 5
power. The gender-motivated violence is private conduct that prevents its
victims which are a disadvantaged group from obtaining equal protection of the
laws." 333 In the alternative, the court held that even if section 5 required state
action in order to justify enactment of enforcement legislation, the states' failure
to protect victims of gender-based violence is sufficient state involvement to
satisfy that requirement.334
In Timm v. DeLong, the court's analysis of the section 5 issue employed the
second of Wright's rationales. Based on congressional findings that the states
have failed to address the problem of violence against women adequately, the
Timm court concluded that the states' failure to afford women equal protection of
the laws constituted sufficient state involvement to justify legislating against
private discriminatory conduct under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.335
In the course of deciding these cases, the courts have had to confront
arguments rooted in the familiar public-private dichotomies. For example, Doe v.
Doe considered and rejected defendant's argument that "VAWA encroaches on
traditional police powers of the state and impermissibly 'federalizes' criminal,
329 U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 5.
3 30 See Wright v. Wright, No. Civ. 98-572-A (W.D. Okla. Apr. 27, 1999); Timm v.
DeLong, 59 F. Supp. 2d 944,961 (D. Neb. 1998).
331 See Wright v. Wright, No. Civ. 98-572-A at 5 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 27, 1999).
3 32 See Wright v. Wright, No. Civ. 98-572-A at 5 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 27, 1999) (citing
Wright v. City of Oklahoma City, No. Civ. 98-572-A (W.D. Okla. July 31, 1998) (citing
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)).
333 Wright v. City of Oklahoma City, No. Civ. 98-572-A at 6 (W.D. Okla. July 31, 1998).
334 See id. at 6-8.
335 Timm, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 958--61. For further discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment
challenge to VAWA, see infra Part V.B.3.
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family law, and state tort law."'336 The Doe court pointed out that the scope of
federal jurisdiction under VAWA expressly excludes state law claims seeldng
establishment of a divorce, alimony, marital property, or child custody decree.337
Moreover, Doe stated that VAWA's civil rights remedy "complements" state
criminal, tort, and family law by making available a separate civil rights action
for damages.338 Similarly, in Ziegler v. Ziegler, a case alleging violence within a
marital relationship, the defendant argued that the civil rights remedy was
unconstitutional as applied in his case because it would "extend[ ] a federal cause
of action in an area of traditional state control, i.e., family law ... -"339 The court
replied that since VAWA is a civil rights statute that by its own terms does not
confer federal jurisdiction over claims for a decree of divorce or related matters,
it does not interfere with state domestic relations laws3 40
Courts upholding the constitutionality of VAWA's civil rights remedy have
not been immune to the lingering influence of traditional conceptions of privacy.
In Seaton v. Seaton, a case upholding VAWA on Commerce Clause grounds and
containing favorable dicta on the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court wrote:
The framers of the Constitution did not intend for the federal courts to play host
to domestic disputes and invade the well-established authority of the sovereign
states .... [This court must again express its deep concern that the Act will
effectively allow domestic relations litigation to permeate the federal courts.
Issues related to domestic relations are better suited for the state courts .... 341
In a passage reminiscent of objections voiced by the Conference of Chief
Justices before VAWA was enacted,342 the Seaton opinion stated, "mhis
particular remedy created by Congress, because of its extreme overbreadth,
opens the doors of the federal courts to parties seeking leverage in [divorce]
settlements rather than true justice.' 343 When language this negative appears in
336 Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 615-16 (D. Conn. 1996).
337 See id. at 616 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4) (1994)).
338 See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 616; see also Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 612
(E.D. Wash. 1998) ("A civil rights remedy is recognized as distinct from that of a criminal
conviction or a civil remedy for a tort. Criminal convictions vindicate the state interest in
protecting its citizens while a civil tort addresses personal injury. A civil rights claim by
contrast addresses equality, a victim's interest in equal treatment.') (citations omitted).
339 Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 614.
340 See id.
341 Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188, 1190-91, 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1997).
342 See supra Part IV.B.
343 Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1190.
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the context of a victory for VAWA, it is clear that the privacy concerns raised by
the judiciary during the legislative process have not been extinguished.
B. The Fourth Circuit Finds the Civil Rights Remedy Unconstitutional:
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
Although the vast majority of courts to address the issue have upheld the
constitutionality of the civil rights remedy, the only case to reach the federal
court of appeals to date resulted in an en banc opinion finding the remedy
unconstitutional. The Fourth Circuit's decision in that case, Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Institute & State University,344 provides a vivid illustration of the
lingering power of stereotypes based on the public-private dichotomies and their
ability to color legal analysis.3 45 The Brzonkala case presents the most fully
developed constitutional challenge to VAWA and is currently under review in
the United States Supreme Court.
1. Facts and Procedural History
According to the plaintiff's complaint,3 46 Christy Brzonkala had recently
enrolled as a freshman at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
(Virginia Tech) when she was raped by defendants Antonio Morrison and James
Crawford, students at Virginia Tech and members of the school's football
team. 347 Within minutes after she met the two men for the first time, they took
turns pinning her down on a bed in a room in her dormitory and forcibly raping
her3 48 After raping Brzonkala, Morrison said to her, "You better not have any
344 The only other case that has held the civil rights remedy to be unconstitutional is
Bergeron v. Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628 (M.D. La. 1999), a federal district court decision that
adopted the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Brzonkala.
345 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison,
120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
346 See generally Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst.
& State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996) (No. 95-1358-R), rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th
Cir. 1997), vacated and reh'g en banc granted (Feb. 5, 1998), aff'd, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. granted sub non United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999). Because the
case was decided on a motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
plaintiff's factual allegations must be taken as true. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 783.
347 See Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 4-6.
348 See id at 6-7.
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fucking diseases." 349 Later, Morrison announced publicly in the dormitory's
dining room, "I like to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them." 350
In the weeks following the rapes, Brzonkala became depressed and
withdrawn and stopped attending classes. 351 She attempted to commit suicide
and sought psychiatric trealment. 352 After Brzonkala filed a complaint against
Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy, she
learned that another male student athlete had advised Crawford that he should
have "killed the bitch."353
The Virginia Tech judicial committee conducted a disciplinary hearing.354
The committee found insufficient evidence to take action against Crawford but
found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and imposed a punishment of immediate
suspension from the school for two semesters.355 However, after a second
hearing, the judicial committee found Morrison guilty of the lesser charge of
"using abusive language," and the sanction of an immediate suspension was set
aside on appeal.356 When she learned from newspaper accounts that Morrison
would be returning to Virginia Tech on a full athletic scholarship, Brzonkala,
humiliated and fearful for her own safety, canceled her plans to return to
school.357
Brzonkala filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia alleging, inter alia, that Morrison and Crawford had violated
her civil rights under the Violence Against Women Act.358 Morrison and
Crawford filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Brzonkala had failed to
state a claim under VAWA and that VAWA is unconstitutional.359 The United
States intervened to defend the constitutionality of the statute.360 The federal
district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that Brzonkala had stated a
valid claim under VAWA's civil rights provision but holding that the provision
3 4 9 Id. at 7.
350 Id. at 8.
351 See id.
35 2 See id.
353 Id. at 10.
3 54 See id. at 10-12.
35 5 See id. at 12.
356 Id. at 15-17.
357 See id. at 16, 18.
358 See id. at 2. Plaintiffs complaint also raised claims under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 and state tort law, which are beyond the scope of the present discussion.
See id.
359 See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 783.
360 See id. at 781.
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is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.361 A panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that Brzonkala
had stated a valid claim and that Congress had constitutional authority to enact
the civil rights remedy under the Commerce Clause.362 After vacating the panel
decision and granting rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit held that Brzonkala
had stated a claim under the civil rights provision but that the provision is
unconstitutional because neither the Commerce Clause nor section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment granted Congress authority to create the civil rights.
remedy.3 63
2. The Commerce Clause Issue
In its analysis of VAWA under the Commerce Clause, the Fourth Circuit
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez.364 In
Lopez, the Supreme Court held by a five to four vote that Congress had exceeded
its authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, a statute that made knowingly possessing a firearm in a
school zone a federal criminal offense.3 65 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for
the Court identified three broad categories of activities to which Congress's
Commerce Clause power extends: Congress may regulate the use of the channels
of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons
or things in interstate commerce; and activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. 366 After concluding that neither of the first two categories could
conceivably apply, the court analyzed the Gun-Free School Zones Act under the
third category.3 67
The Court described the challenged statute as a criminal law "that by its
terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise,
361 See id. at 779.
3 62 See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 974. The panel voted two to one, with Judge Motz writing
the majority opinion, in which Judge Hall joined, and Judge Luttig writing a dissent.
3 63 See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d 820, 889 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. United
States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999). The court reached its decision by a seven to four vote.
The majority opinion was written by Judge Luttig, who had dissented from the earlier panel
decision, and was joined by six other judges. Chief Judge Wilkinson and Judge Niemeyer
wrote concurring opinions. Judge Motz, who had written the majority opinion for the panel,
wrote a dissent, in which three other judges joined.
364 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
36 5 See id.
366 See id. at 558-59.
367 See id. at 559.
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however broadly one might define those terms."368 However, this was not the
end of the inquiry. After noting that the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not
contain a jurisdictional element that would require proof of an effect on interstate
commerce in each case, the Court proceeded to examine whether gun possession
in school zones in general has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.369 The
Court stated that "no such... effect was visible to the naked eye" and that
Congress had failed to make any findings of such an effect when it passed the
statute.370 In the absence of such findings, the Government argued that
possession of a firearm in a school zone could result in violent crime, which is
costly and reduces people's willingness to travel to areas perceived as unsafe; the
government also argued that guns in schools undermine the educational process,
which will result in a less productive citizenry, with adverse effects on the
nation's economy.371 The Court responded that to uphold the Government's
contentions, "we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that
would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to
a general police power of the sort retained by the States.' 372 Under the
Government's theory, the Court wrote, "it is difficult to perceive any limitation
on federal power."373
The Lopez case reveals a deep concern about issues of federalism, and
especially about federal intrusion in areas traditionally controlled by the states.
The opinion of the Court described criminal law as an area "where States
historically have been sovereign"374 and criticized the Gun-Free School Zones
Act for overriding and displacing state law.375 Justice Kennedy's concurrence,
joined by Justice O'Connor, emphasized even more strongly the dangers of
allowing Congress to "take over the regulation of... areas of traditional state
concemn."
376
3 68 Id. at 561.
36 9 See id. at 561-68.
370 Id. at 562-63. The Court stated that congressional findings are neither necessary nor
sufficient for the Court to find a substantial effect on interstate commerce, which is a judicial
rather than legislative determination. See id. at 557 n.2, 562-63. However, findings by
Congress and by congressional committees can assist the Court in evaluating the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affects interstate commerce. See id. at 562-
63.
37 1 See id. at 564. The Court characterized these two arguments as the "costs of crime"
argument and the "national productivity" argument respectively. See id.
372 Id. at 567.
373 Id. at 564.
374 Id.
375 See id. at 561 n.3.
376 See id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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The Gun-Free School Zones Act struck down in Lopez is readily
distinguishable from the Violence Against Women Act's civil rights
provision.377 In the process of passing VAWA, Congress made extensive
findings, based on numerous hearings and studies conducted over more than four
years, demonstrating the enormous effects of gender-motivated violence on
interstate commerce.378 Thus, there is no need to "pile inference upon inference"
in order to establish those effects.379 Also, the connection of gender-motivated
violence to interstate commerce is far more direct than the speculative,
attenuated connection adduced by the Government in Lopez.3 80 Contrary to the
concerns expressed in Lopez by both the majority opinion and Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, VAWA does not intrude in an area of law traditionally controlled
by the states; it is a civil rights remedy, and civil rights remedies have historically
been the province of the federal courts.3 81 Rather than duplicating state laws on
the same subject, as the Gun-Free School Zones Act did, VAWA's civil rights
remedy was passed to protect an equality interest that was not adequately
addressed by existing state and federal laws.382
And yet, in Brzonkala, the court of appeals, sitting en bane, affirmed the
district court's holding that the civil rights remedy exceeds Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause.3 83 In so doing, the Brzonkala case reveals the
familiar tendency to equate women with the domestic sphere, with privacy, and
with state jurisdiction.
The en banc opinion placed considerable emphasis on the fact that VAWA's
377 On the constitutionality of VAWA in the wake of Lopez, see generally, e.g., Kerrie E.
Maloney, Note, Gender-Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights
Provision of the Violence Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1876 (1996);
Johanna R Shargel, Note, In Defense of the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against
WomenAct, 106 YALELJ. 1849 (1997).
378 See supra Parts IV.A, VA.
379 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
3 80 In Lopez, the United States relied on arguments that guns in schools might cause
violent crime, which is costly, and could undermine the educational process, resulting in a less
productive national workforce. See id. at 564. By contrast, the legislative history of VAWA
includes findings that, for example, almost 50% of rape victims lose their jobs or are forced to
quit in the aftermath of the crime, and that actual and threatened gender-based violence prevent
women from traveling interstate and from engaging in employment in interstate business. See
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385; S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993).
381 See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 932 (4th
Cir.) (en banc) (Motz, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S.
Ct. 11 (1999).
382 See id. at 930 (Motz, J., dissenting) (arguing that VAWA "acts to supplement, rather
than supplant, state law").
383 See id. at 889.
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civil rights provision would cover violence within the family.384 In fact by
attacking the statute on the basis of its coverage of intrafamily violence, the
opinion effectively conflated all violence against women with domestic
violence. 385 Given the facts alleged in the case at hand-a gang rape of a young
woman at a public university by two men whom she had just met-this approach
seems highly arbitrary. After positioning violence against women in the private,
domestic sphere, the opinion proceeded to invoke the doctrine of legal
nonintervention in the affairs of the family by criticizing VAWA for overriding
"interspousal and intrafamily tort immunity, the marital rape exemption, and
other defenses that may exist under state law by virtue of the relationship that
exists between the violent actor and victim. '386 As we have seen, these now-
discredited doctrines are relics of both the marital unity theory and the separate
spheres ideology. Nevertheless, the Brzonkala court defended the states' freedom
to "calibrate the extent of judicial supervision of intrafamily violence" through
such doctrines and deplored the creation of a civil rights remedy that would
cover gender-motivated violence within the family.387
Having characterized all gender-motivated violence as belonging to the
domestic sphere, the Brzonkala court concluded that such conduct has
insufficient impact on commerce. The court of appeals stated that VAWA "does
not regulate even arguably economic activity."388 Of course, under Lopez, the
fact that an activity is not overtly economic is not determinative. Instead, the
crucial question is whether the activity substantially affects interstate
commerce.389 To that question, the district court and the court of appeals
answered with a resounding "no." Although the trial judge conceded that the
impact of violence against women on interstate commerce is more immediate
than that of possessing guns in school zones, he nevertheless concluded that the
VAWA, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act regulates activity that is simply
"too remote" from interstate commerce.390 Similarly, the en banc opinion
384 See id. at 842.
385 See id. (describing domestic violence as "a primary focus" of the civil rights remedy);
see also id. at 904-05 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (using phrase "domestic violence" as a
synonym for gender-motivated violence).
386 Id. at 843, 873.
387 See id. at 843. The court conceded that "Congress may well be correct... that these
defenses represent regrettable public policy," but asserted that the question of whether to
eliminate them should rest with the states. Id.
388 See id. at 835; see also id. at 834 (stating that gender-motivated violence is "[n]ot
only... clearly not commercial, it is not even economic in any meaningful sense").
389 See id. at 917-18 (Motz, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995)).
390 Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 790-91.
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described the impact of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce as too
indirect to justify legislation under the Commerce Clause.391
The conclusion that violence against women lacks substantial effects on
interstate commerce is curious in light of the voluminous congressional findings
of just such effects. 392 Given the overwhelming evidence in the legislative
history that violence against women dramatically and directly affects women's
employment, health care, consumer spending, and interstate travel, among other
economic factors, it is difficult to understand the Brzonkala court's assertion that
violence against women has less economic impact than a farmer's production of
homegrown wheat for personal consumption.393 The Brzonkala court's refusal to
find adequate effects on interstate commerce is particularly surprising when one
considers the highly deferential test established for determining whether
Congress had authority to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause.394
Brzonkala's refusal to acknowledge the substantial effects of gender-based
violence on interstate commerce makes perfect sense when seen as a
manifestation of the assumption that the domestic sphere and market sphere are
mutually exclusive, and what occurs in the former has no effect on the latter. At
oral argument, one judge asked the Justice Department lawyer defending
391 See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 851.
392 See generally supra Parts IVA and VA. Brzonkala contended that much of VAWA's
legislative history considered the impact on interstate commerce of violence against women in
general, and therefore was irrelevant to the establishment of a civil rights remedy for gender-
motivated violence specifically. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 849-50. However, Congress heard
testimony that violence against women is often motivated by the victim's gender. See 1993
House Hearing, supra note 67, at 5 (statement of Sally Goldfarb, Senior Staff Attorney, NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund); 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 250, at 262 (statement
of Dr. Leslie R. Wolfe, Executive Director, Center for Women Policy Studies); see also
Brzonkala, 160 F.3d at 851 (citing congressional findings concerning the impact of gender-
motivated violence on interstate commerce and conceding that the legislative record "supports
an inference that some portion of [violence against women], and the toll that it exacts, is
attributable to gender animus").
393 See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 835 (citing Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)); see
also id. at 916 (Motz, J., dissenting) (stating that "[c]ertainly legislators could rationally find
that the impact of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce was at least as substantial
as the impact of growing wheat for home consumption" and citing Wickard, supra).
394 Lopez, although it struck down a federal statute under the Commerce Clause for the
first time in almost sixty years, did not overturn but rather reaffirmed previous Commerce
Clause cases. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553-61 (1995). Under that precedent,
the relevant test is simply "whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated
activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce," see id. at 557, and if so, "'the means chosen
by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution."' Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (citing Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,262 (1964)).
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VAWA's constitutionality, "If we have a domestic assault that occurs in the
bedroom between a man and a woman, how does that affect commerce?" 395 In a
similar vein, Chief Judge Wilkinson's concurring opinion states, 'By attaching
civil penalties to criminal, but domestic, conduct, [the civil rights provision] 'by
its terms has nothing to do with "commerce."' ' 396
The court's view of violence against women and market relations as taking
place in two separate spheres is ironic given the facts alleged in the Brzonkala
case. The plaintiff alleged that the rape she sufferedon campus caused her to
leave Virginia Tech without receiving the education for which she had paid.397
In other contexts, paying for a college education has been found to be "a
quintessential commercial transaction. '398
Thus, the Brzonkala court erred by equating all violence against women with
domestic violence, and then compounded that error by assuming that domestic
violence has no substantial effects on interstate commerce. In fact, as Congress
found, violence against women-including domestic violence-has massive
economic effects.399 The Senate Judiciary Committee cited estimates that
domestic violence costs society between five and ten billion dollars a year.400
One particularly significant effect of domestic violence is its role in causing
women's disproportionate rates of homelessness, poverty, and dependency on
welfare. Contrary to Brzonkala's assertion that gender-motivated violence is "a
395 See Jan Vertefeuille, Appeals Court Scrutinizes Violence Against Women Act,
ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWs, Mar. 4, 1998, at B3 (quoting Judge Paul Niemeyer at oral
argument en banc).
3 96 Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 896 (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at
561).
3 97 See Plaintiffs Amended Complaint at 18 (alleging Virginia Tech failed to refund
plaintiff's expenses for room, board, books, and fees). The damaging effect of campus rape on
women's educational opportunities, and the resulting erosion of young women's future earning
potential, were subjects covered in VAWA's legislative history. See 1993 House Hearing,
supra note 67, at 4 (statement of Sally Goldfarb, Senior Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund); 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 250, at 243 (statement of Elizabeth
Athanasakos, President, National Federation of Business and Professional Women, Inc.); S.
REP. No. 101-545, at 43-44 (1990).
398 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying Sherman Act
to university financial aid policy); see also United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1213 (6th
Cir. 1995) (classifying college as an "activity affecting interstate commerce" for purpose of
prosecution under federal arson statute).
399 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 101-545, at 33 (1990) ('CIt is not a simple matter of adding up
medical costs, or law enforcement costs, but of adding up all those expenses plus the costs of
lost careers, decreased productivity, foregone educational opportunities, and long-term health
problems.").
40 0 See S. REp. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993).
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type of crime relatively unlikely to have any economic character at all,"40 1 such
violence is to a large degree responsible for excluding women from successful
participation in the economy altogether. The Senate Judiciary Committee pointed
out that "as many as 50 percent of homeless women and children are fleeing
domestic violence." 402 The need to flee their homes also forces victims of
domestic violence to rely on welfare 403
In addition, abusive spouses or partners often prevent women from getting or
keeping jobs.404 Studies have shown that when a woman attempts to escape from
poverty or welfare dependency by seeking education or employment, an abusive
spouse or partner often directly sabotages those efforts by inflicting physical
injury, destroying materials the woman needs for work or school, or harassing
the woman at her place of employment so that she is fired or forced to quit.405 If
a battered woman manages to keep her job, episodes of domestic violence
frequently cause her to miss work, arrive late, and perform unproductively, with
resulting costs to her employer and to her own career prospects.4 06 Even when
the violence has ended, the long-term physical and psychological effects of abuse
often make it impossible for a woman to function successfully in the work
force.407
As these facts suggest, far from having no effect on the public sphere of the
marketplace, domestic violence has the very pronounced effect of preventing
women from becoming equal participants in that sphere. Like domestic violence,
other forms of gender-motivated violence-such as stranger rape-also prevent
women from participating freely in the economy. Studies indicate that almost
fifty percent of rape victims quit or are fired in the aftermath of the crime.408
401 Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 834.
402 See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 37 (1990) (citation omitted).
403 See Ruth A. Brandwein, Family Violence, Women, and Welfare, in BATrERm
WOMEN, CHmDREN, AND WELFARE REFORM: THE TIES THAT BIND 3, 7 (Ruth A. Brandwein
ed., 1999).
4 04 See 1992 House Hearing, supra note 246, at 117 (statement of Marcella Maxwell,
Chairperson, New York City Commission on the Status of Women, stating that "women
cannot work because of possessive/abusive spouses, or they are limited to working in places
where the spouse can maintain control or contact").
405 See Jody Raphael, Keeping Women Poor: How Domestic Violence Prevents Women
From Leaving Welfare and Entering the World of Work, in BATrERED WOMEN, CHILDREN,
AND WELFARE REFORM: THE TIES THAT BIND, supra note 403, at 31-43.
406 See 1990 Senate Hearing, supra note 244, at 70 (statement of Helen Neubome,
Excecutive Director, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund); 1991 Senate Hearing, supra
note 250, at 239-43 (statement of Elizabeth Athanasakos, President, National Federation of
Business and Professional Women, Inc.); S. REP. No. 101-545, at 37 (1990).
4 07 See Brandwein, supra note 403, at 7-8.
4 08 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at54 (1993).
2000]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNVAL
Fear of rape takes a substantial toll on women's earning opportunities by
deterring women from taking well-paying jobs that are perceived as dangerous
because of their hours, location, or the need to take unsafe public
transportation.409 This deterrent effect limits the employment options of women
as a group 4 10
Despite Brzonkala's statement that gender-motivated violence "lacks a
meaningful connection with any particular, identifiable economic enterprise or
transaction," it is clear that such violence is a major obstacle to women's
employment and that employment is unquestionably an "identifiable economic
enterprise or transaction."411 Moreover, unlike other phenomena that might stand
in the way of employment, such as violent crime in general,412 gender-motivated
violence does so through the mechanism of discrimination.4 13 By impeding
women's ability to be gainfully employed, gender-motivated violence has
contributed substantially to women's economic inferiority to men.4 14 VAWA is
part of a broad statutory scheme to ensure women's equal participation in
employment, a scheme that also includes Title VI.415 When discrimination
functions as a barrier to a disadvantaged group's full-fledged participation in the
4 09 See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 40-41 (testimony of Professor Burt
Neubome, New York University School of Law); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993); S. REP.
No. 102-197, at 38-39 (1991).
4 10 See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 109 (statement of James P. Turner, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, stating that
"women, as a group, are deterred from engaging in commerce. The deterrent message extends
far beyond those touched immediately by crime to all women').
411 See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 834 (4th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. CL 11 (1999); see
also id. at 839 n.8 (stating that gender-motivated violence affects no specific enterprise with
clear links to the economy).
4 12 But see id. at 860 (asserting that the effects of gender-motivated violence on interstate
commerce are identical to those of crime in general).
413 See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 109 (statement of James P. Turner,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, stating
that "[i]t is the bias element that sets these crimes apart and strengthens the Commerce Clause
rationale for reaching them").
4 14 On the discriminatory impact of violence against women, see generally supra Part II.
See also, e.g., Martha F. Davis & Susan J. Kraham, Protecting Women's Welfare in the Face of
Violence, 22 FORDHAm URB. L.L 1141, 1144 (1995) ("[V]iolence affects poor women in two
critical ways: it makes them poor and it keeps them poor.'n); see also Goldscheid, supra note
68, at 147 (stating that male batterers interfere with women's employment in order to ensure
conformity to traditional gender roles).




national economy, antidiscrimination legislation enacted under the Commerce
Clause is an appropriate response.416
Another prominent theme in Brzonkala's Commerce Clause analysis is the
desire to exclude family-related cases from federal jurisdiction. This theme
appears in the opinion in two forms: a concern that VAWA's civil rights
provision actually brings family law cases into the federal courts, and a concern
that if VAWA is permissible under the Commerce Clause, then a substantive
federal domestic relations law would also be permissible.
On the first point, the Brzonkala court quoted with approval Chief Justice
Rehnquist's statement, made while VAWA was pending in Congress, that the
civil rights provision "could involve the federal courts in a whole host of
domestic relations disputes. '417 Although Brzonkala conceded that VAWA's
statutory language expressly precludes the federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction over state law claims for domestic relations decrees, the court treated
this limiting language as a danger sign rather than a source of reassurance.418
"[T]he fact that Congress found it necessary to include such a jurisdictional
disclaimer," the court wrote, "confirms both the factual proximity of the conduct
regulated by [the civil rights provision] to the traditional objects of family law,
and the extent of [the provision's] arrogation to the federal judiciary of
jurisdiction over controversies that have always been resolved by the courts of
the several States." 419 Accordingly, the court concluded, VAWA's coverage of
416 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) ("Congress acted well
within its power to protect and foster commerce" when it prohibited race discrimination in
restaurants after hearing testimony that such discrimination adversely affects interstate
commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964)
(holding that Congress could constitutionally forbid hotels to discriminate on the basis of race
because such race discrimination obstructs interstate commerce); see also 1993 House
Hearing, supra note 67, at 43-44 (statement of Professor Burt Neubome, New York
University School of Law, stating that Congress's authority to enact civil rights remedy under
the Commerce Clause is "supported by a need to eradicate the destructive effects of gender bias
from our economic system"); id. at 60 (statement of Professor Cass Sunstein, University of
Chicago Law School, stating that violent discrimination presents a stronger case for legislation
under the Commerce Clause than nonviolent discrimination of the type at issue in Heart of
Atlanta Motel). A number of cases upholding VAWA relied on McClung or Heart of Atlanta
Motel as precedent for Congress's ability to use the Commerce Clause to combat
discrimination. See, e.g., Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 612 (E.D. Wash. 1998);
Crisonino v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Seaton v.
Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188, 1194-95 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 617
(D. Conn. 1996).
4 17 Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 842 (quoting Rehnquist, 1991 Year-End Report, supra note
269, at 3).
4 18 See id.
4 19 Id. (citations omitted). In fact, as noted supra in Parts IV.B and IV.C, the reason that
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domestic violence, which "frequently arise[s] from the same facts that give rise
to issues such as divorce and child custody," is likely to embroil the federal
courts in issues that "lie at the very core of family law."420 The flaws of this
argument have already been noted: not all VAWA cases arise in a domestic
setting; state courts have never had a monopoly on family-related issues; VAWA
creates a civil rights claim and expressly excludes domestic relations causes of
action; and VAWA is an antidiscrimination statute that complements, rather than
supplants, state family law. 421
The Brzonkala opinion also claims that any rationale under which Congress
had authority to enact VAWA under the Commerce Clause would apply equally
strongly to allowing Congress to usurp the entire field of domestic relations
law.422 This argument completely disregards the discriminatory aspect of
gender-motivated violence, which is the entire focus of VAWA's civil rights
provision. Gender-motivated violence does not merely affect interstate
commerce; it does so by excluding a disadvantaged group from equal
participation in interstate commerce.423 As a civil rights statute, VAWA
responds directly to this discriminatory economic impact Thus, there is no
legitimate analogy between a federal statute prohibiting gender-motivated
violence and a federal statute establishing a national law of divorce.
Congress found it necessary to include such a jurisdictional disclaimer was to meet the
demands of the federal judiciary.
420 See id.; see also id. at 896 (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring) ("VAWA's civil suit
provision falters for the most basic of reasons. Section 13981 scales the last redoubt of state
government-the regulation of domestic relations.").
421 See supra Parts II.A.3, IV.A, IV.B.
422 See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 828 (approving district court's conclusion that "the
practical implications of concluding that gender-motivated violence was sufficiently related to
interstate commerce to justify its regulation would be to grant Congress power to regulate
virtually the whole of criminal and domestic relations law"); id. at 843 ("[11o adopt such an
understanding of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce would be to extend federal
control to a vast range of problems falling within even the most traditional areas of state
concern... even divorce... ."); id. at 854 (arguing that the congressional findings relied on by
VAWA's defenders "would justify federal regulation, and even occupation, of the entire field
of family law, including divorce, alimony, child custody, and the equitable division of
property"); id. at 859 (noting that if "Congress can regulate any problem solely by finding that
it affects the economy and has not been fully remedied by the States," then Congress can
"directly and perhaps exclusively" regulate core areas of family law including divorce,
alimony, equitable division of property, and child custody).
42 3 See S. REp. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993) ("Gender-based violence bars its most likely
targets-women- from full [participation] in the national economy").
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3. The Fourteenth Amendment Issue
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, sometimes known as the
Enforcement Clause, is a "positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."424 Under
section 5, Congress is not limited to prohibiting acts that violate the Equal
Protection Clause,425 but may go further and pass laws designed to prevent or
remedy such acts. 426
During its deliberations on the Violence Against Women Act, Congress was
presented with two distinct theories under which section 5 provides
constitutional authority for enactment of the civil rights remedy. First, under
section 5, Congress may prohibit purely private conduct that interferes with the
equality values protected by section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.427 On this
theory, Congress may pass VAWA because acts of gender-motivated violence
fundamentally erode women's opportunities for equality. Second, section 5
permits Congress to prohibit private conduct as a prophylactic measure to
prevent or correct state action that would violate section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 28 This theory allows Congress to pass the civil rights remedy in
response to the discrimination practiced by state actors whose inadequate legal
remedies and outright gender bias have denied female crime victims equal
protection of the laws.429
After VAWA was signed into law, the Supreme Court decided City of
424 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651 (1966).
425 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No state shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"), with § 5 ('The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article").
426 See generally, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
427 See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 46 (statement of Professor Burt Neubome,
New York University School of Law, citing District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418
(1973); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966)); 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 250, at 98 (same). As noted supra in Part VA,
Wright v. Wright, No. Civ. 98-572-A (W.D. Okla. Apr. 27, 1999), adopted this theory.
4 28 See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 63-64 (statement of Professor Cass
Sunstein, University of Chicago Law School, citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156 (1980)); 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 250, at 119-20 (same).
429 See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 67, at 64-67 (statement of Cass Sunstein,
University of Chicago Law School); 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 250, at 120-23 (same);
see also Wright v. Wright, No. Civ. 98-572-A at 5 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 27, 1999); Timm v.
DeLong, 59 F. Supp. 2d 944,960 (D. Neb. 1998).
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Boerne v. Flores,4 30 potentially complicating the question of Congress's
authority to enact the civil rights provision under section 5. In Boerne, the
Supreme Court invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
Congress passed RFRA in an explicit effort to override the standard adopted by
the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith.4 31 Smith had held that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not require the states to have a compelling
justification for neutral, generally applicable laws that substantially burden
religious practices.432 RFRA sought to reimpose such a requirement.433 In
Boerne, the Court held that section 5 is a remedial provision and does not confer
on Congress the power to alter the substantive rights guaranteed by section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.434 The Court also stated that when Congress
attempts to enact a preventive or remedial measure, "[t]here must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end."'435
The Boerne case is not fatal to VAWA's civil rights remedy. The Supreme
Court stressed in Boerne that congressional enactments under section 5 are
entitled to great (although not unlimited) deference.436 VAWA, unlike RERA,
did not purport to bring about "a substantive change in constitutional
protections."437 Whereas the court in Boerne noted that RFRA's legislative
history was unable to document any instances of religious persecution occurring
within the past forty years,43 8 VAWA's legislative history was rife with
examples of current state practices that discriminate against female victims of
violent crime.439 Moreover, Boerne reaffirmed that section 5 grants Congress
"wide latitude" to pass "[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional
violations.., even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously
reserved to the states."' 440
Subsequently, in the 1999 case of Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
430 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
431 See id. at 521 U.S. at 512-16 (citing Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)).
432 See id. at 512-14.
433 See id. at 514-16.
434 See id. at 520-29.
4 3 5 Id. at 520.
4 36 See id. at 536.
4 37 See id. at 532.
438 See id. at 530-33.
4 39 See supra Part IVA. See also infra notes 447-50 and 461-63 and accompanying text.
4 40Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518, 520 (citation omitted).
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Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,441 the Court again stated that section 5
permits Congress to pass legislation designed to remedy or prevent
transgressions of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive guarantees, even
where doing so involves prohibiting conduct that is not itself unconstitutional. In
that case, the court struck down the Patent Remedy Act, which provided a
federal damages remedy against states for patent infringement. Like RFRA, and
unlike VAWA, the Patent Remedy Act was passed without any record that the
states were engaging in a pattern of constitutional violations. 442
The Fourth Circuit in Brzonkala relied heavily on the Boerne decision for its
holding that VAWA's civil rights provision was not a valid legislative enactment
under section 5.443 The Fourth Circuit misapplied Boerne in three important
respects. First, Brzonkala found that no state action was present to justify
VAWA's civil rights remedy.4 " Second, Brzonkala held that section 5 permits
Congress only to regulate state action and provides no basis for creating a claim
against private actors. 445 Relying on Boerne, Brzonkala also found that the civil
rights remedy lacks the requisite congruence and proportionality between the
means employed and the ends sought to be achieved.446 Each of these
conclusions is incorrect.
The Brzonkala court's analysis improperly dismissed the significance of
Congress's findings, based on extensive empirical evidence, that "existing bias
and discrimination in the criminal justice system often deprives victims of crimes
of violence motivated by gender of equal protection of the laws. 447 The
legislative history is replete with evidence that the states often treat "crimes
disproportionately affecting women... less seriously than comparable crimes
against men. 44 8 Female victims of rape and domestic violence face barriers of
state law and policy that are not imposed on other crime victims. 44 9 Many of
441 119 S. Ct. 2199,2206-07 (1999).
442 See id. at 2207-08.
443 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 861-89 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. grantedsub nor. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
444 See id. at 883-85.
445 See id. at 862-80.
446 See id. at 885-86.
447 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994); see also S. REP. No. 103-138, at 55
(1993) ("[T]he criminal justice system is not providing equal protection of the laws [to]
women in the classic sense."') (quoting statement of Professor Cass Sunstein).
448 See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 43-44 (1991) (citing gender bias task force studies); see
also, eg., S. REP. No. 103-138, at 45-47, 49 (1993) (describing "overwhelming evidence" of
gender bias against women in the state courts and citing gender bias task force studies).
449 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993); 1991 S REP. No. 102-197, at 34 (1991).
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these practices stem from state actors' invidious stereotypes about women,4 50 a
form of sex discrimination that has long been recognized as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause.451
This record of pervasive Equal Protection violations supports Congress's
section 5 power to enact preventive or remedial legislation, including legislation
providing a cause of action against private actors. Contrary to the Fourth
Circuit's assertion,452 the Supreme Court has never held that Congress is barred
from regulating private conduct in order to provide a remedy for unconstitutional
state action. 453 As the Senate Judiciary Committee concluded in its analysis of
section 5's application to VAWA, "While the 14th amendment itself only covers
actions by the States, Congress's power to enforce the amendment includes the
power to create a private remedy as the most effective means to fight public
discrimination. '454 Boerne, with its clear statement that Congress's powers
under section 5 extend beyond the range of conduct that would violate section 1,
does not foreclose this possibility.455
Relying on Boerne, the Brzonkala court found that the civil rights remedy
lacks the requisite congruence and proportionality between the means employed
and the end sought to be achieved, because permitting civil actions against
individual perpetrators of gender-motivated violent crimes is not calculated to
remedy the discriminatory practices of the states. 456 On the contrary, the civil
rights remedy is part of a comprehensive legislative initiative that also includes
measures aimed directly at improving states' performance in cases of violence
against women. 457 The civil rights measure itself is designed to inspire states to
450 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993) (describing "archaic prejudices" against
women among "those within the justice system.").
451 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-46, 550 (1996); J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135-42 (1994); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718,724-26 (1982).
452 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 862 (4th Cir.)
(en bane), cert. grantedsub nor. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
453 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 n.8 (1973); United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 782 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
454 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 55 n.72 (1993) (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1996) and Carter, 409 U.S. 418).
455 See City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1997).
456 See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 885-86.
457 See supra Part I. The Brzonkala court claimed that the provisions in VAWA granting
federal funds to the states indicate that Congress could not have been truly concerned about the
states' discriminatory practices when in enacted the civil lights remedy. See Brzonkala, 169
F.3d at 886. On the contrary, there is nothing inconsistent about Congress attempting to
address the problem of discrimination in state legal systems both by providing grants to help
states improve their performance and by declaring that perpetrators of gender-motivated
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place a high priority on these crimes 45s The fact that VAWA creates a civil
rights cause of action against individuals, not against states, is a strength rather
than a weakness of the legislation. Permitting victims of gender-motivated crime
to sue the states could deplete the state resources available to fight such crimes
and would be more intrusive into state authority. A remedy against the states
might also clash with the principles underlying prosecutorial, judicial, and
sovereign immunity. VAWA's remedy is narrowly drawn and well matched to
the goal Congress sought to achieve.459
In finding VAWA's civil rights remedy invalid under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Brzonkala court repeatedly described acts of
gender-motivated violence as "private."460 This description reveals the court's
failure to appreciate the public nature of gender-motivated violence. Although it
is usually committed by private actors rather than state actors, gender-motivated
violence nevertheless is sufficiently connected to the public sphere of the state so
as to bring it within the scope of Congress's legislative power under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Both causes and effects of gender-motivated
violence are located in the public sphere.
As the legislative history of VAWA demonstrated, inadequate and
discriminatory state legal systems are among the causes of gender-motivated
violence. State action is present in the adoption and enforcement of marital rape
exemptions and intrafamily tort immunities that expressly permit men to rape
and batter their wives. State action is also present when evidentiary rules and
standard jury instructions subject rape victims to suspicion not cast on victims of
other crimes. 461 It is present, too, when judges and prosecutors engage in openly
discriminatory behavior against female victims of violent crime.4 62 These
instances of state action, and others like them, have an effect on private actors
violence violate their victims' federal civil rights.
458 See 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 250, at 156 (statement of Gill Freeman, Chair,
Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Implementation Commission, stating that civil
rights remedy will "by its very existence, increase the responsiveness of the states").
4 59 In Florida Prepaid Secondary Education Expense Board, the Supreme Court noted
with disapproval that the Patent Remedy Act would expose states to "expansive liability" for
"[a]n unlimited range of state conduct" Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd.
v. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (1999). Similarly, in Boerne, the Court
criticized RFRA's "[s]weeping coverage ensur[ing] its intrusion at every level of government."
See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. By comparison, VAWA's narrowly-drawn remedy, which
requires proof of gender motivation in each case, is far more similar to the antidiscrimination
measures in the Voting Rights Act, which were explicitly approved by the Court in Boerne.
See id. at 532-33.
460 SeeBrzonkala, 169 F.3d at 826,853, 862, 874,889.
461 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 55 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 44-46 (1991).
462 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 45-47,49 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 34,43 (1991).
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who commit crimes of gender-motivated violence. The policies and practices of
the legal system facilitate acts of violence by private individuals by reassuring
them that conviction and punishment are impossible or unlikely and by
conveying the message that violence against women is acceptable4 63 What sets
these policies and practices apart from other instances of state failure to prevent
or redress crimes is that the states have engaged in sex discrimination by singling
out crimes that primarily affectwomen for an indifferent or hostile response. The
sex-discriminatory practices of the states facilitate the sex-discriminatory
practices of individuals who perpetrate gender-motivated crimes. This
intermingling of state and private discrimination is sufficient to authorize
congressional action under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 64
Just as the roots of gender-motivated violence can be found in the public
sphere, so can its effects. Many victims and observers have noted that victims of
rape and domestic violence are often revictimized by their discriminatory
treatment at the hands of police, prosecutors, and judges. 465 State actors are thus
responsible for exacerbating the harm inflicted by the violence itself 466
463 On the relationship between inadequate legal sanctions and men's propensity to
commit violence against women, see, e.g., NATIONAL JUDICIAL EDUC. PROGRAM TO PROMOTE
EQUALITY FOR WOMEN & MEN IN THE COURTS, UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE
JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO STRANGER AND NON-STRANGER RAPE AND SEXUAL AssAuLT 111-35 to
mH-36 (1994) (providing anecdotal evidence that tendency to commit date rape is reduced when
men perceive that serious sanctions will ensue); Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in
Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System,
11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3 (1999) (discussing effect of mandatory arrest and no-drop
policies); Joan Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?: Analysis and Policy Implications of
New Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 New Eng. L. Rev. 929 (1994) (analyzing studies of
effect of arrest on batterers' recidivism rates); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor
Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIUMINOLOGY 46 (1992) (same). At the very least, the
failure to convict and incarcerate serial rapists and batterers because of gender bias leaves them
free to strike again. See 1990 Senate Hearing, supra note 244, at 64 (statement of Helen
Neubome, Executive Director, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, describing case of
accused rapist who was acquitted by jurors who felt that the way the victim was dressed
showed that she was "asking for" the attack; defendant was later convicted of a different rape).
464 See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966); see also 1993 House
Hearing, supra note 67, at 67 (statement of Professor Cass Sunstein, University of Chicago
Law School, stating that "there is far clearer state involvement here than in Guest itself, which
found sufficient involvement solely on the basis of false private reports of criminal activity that
had been given to police officers").
465 See, e.g., 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 250, at 148-49 (statement of Gill Freeman,
Chair, Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Implementation Commission).
466 See Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and
Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1671 (1990) ("When clerks in a local court harass a




Moreover, as noted earlier, gender-motivated violence reduces women to
second-class citizenship.4 67 Both women who have personally experienced
gender-motivated violence, and those who are fearful that they may experience
it, suffer from sharply reduced opportunities for social, economic, and political
activity.46 8 As a group-based denial of equality, rather than merely a personal
injury, gender-motivated violence has an impact on the nation as a whole. It is
"an assault on a publicly shared ideal of equality."469 By characterizing gender-
motivated violence as "private," the Brzonkala opinion ignores the substantial
public effects of such violence. 470
4. The Federalism Issue
Concerns about federalism are prominently featured throughout the
Brzonkala opinion. The opinion's opening paragraphs are a paean to "the
principles of limited federal government upon which this Nation is founded." 471
The court repeatedly emphasized that it was invalidating VAWA's civil rights
remedy because to do otherwise would obliterate the distinction between federal
and state government.4 72 According to the court, if the civil rights remedy is
constitutionally permissible, "then Congress could circumvent the constitutional
467 See supra Parts II, IV.A.
468 See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 38 (1991) ("The cost of violence against women must be
measured not only in the lives scarred or lost by the violence itself, but the lives left unfulfilled
because of the fear of violence .... This fear takes a substantial toll on the lives of all women,
in lost work, social, and even leisure opportunities.").
469 See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 43 (1990) (citing testimony of Helen Neubome).
470 Of course, all crimes have some effect on society, but gender-motivated crimes,
because of their discriminatory element, directly implicate the equal protection concerns of the
Fourteenth Amendment
471 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 826 (4th Cir.)
(en bane), cert. grantedsub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
472 See id. at 838 (stating that upholding VAWA would "convert the power to regulate
interstate commerce into a general police power"); id. at 843 (cautioning that if VAWA is
found constitutional under the Commerce Clause, "essentially limitless
congressional ... would follow"); id. at 844 (stating that accepting the reasoning advanced in
support of VAWA would "support a power in the Congress that is, for all intents and purposes,
without limit"); id. at 852 (claiming that upholding VAWA under the Commerce Clause would
"grant[ ] Congress an unlimited police power inconsistent with a Constitution of enumerated
and limited federal powers"); id. at 888 (stating that if VAWA is valid under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, "then in effect the federal government could constitutionally regulate
every aspect of society, even including those areas traditionally thought to be reserved
exclusively to the several States....').
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limits on federal power imposed by both the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment... and claim a general police power ... ,,473
This slippery slope argument is crucial to the court's reasoning, yet it relies
on a highly distorted view of VAWA's civil rights remedy. The distortion arises
from the fact that the court has characterized violence against women as purely
"private" in terms of both the market-family dichotomy and the state-civil
society dichotomy.474 From this point of view, it is natural to conclude, as the
court did, that upholding VAWA would be equivalent to granting Congress "a
plenary power over every aspect of human affairs-no matter how private, no
matter how local, no matter how remote from commerce." 475 If, however, one
takes into account the numerous public aspects of gender-motivated violence-
its substantial effect on interstate commerce; its role as an impediment to
women's equal employment opportunity; the states' failure to enact and enforce
laws that respond to such violence adequately and evenhandedly; the fact that
gender-motivated violence discriminates based on membership in a
disadvantaged social group and relegates all members of that group to a form of
second-class citizenship-it becomes apparent that the civil rights remedy does
not represent a breakdown of the distinction between federal and state
jurisdiction. Rather, federal jurisdiction is warranted by the significant links
between gender-motivated violence and the public spheres of the market and the
state.
The fact that VAWA is an antidiscrimination measure is particularly
significant in meeting the Brzonkala court's federalism concerns. For example,
in the course of its Commerce Clause analysis, the court claimed that the
justifications for VAWA are indistinguishable from the "national productivity"
and "costs of crime" arguments that the United States advanced unsuccessfully
in its defense of the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez. 4 76 Those arguments,
according to both Lopez and Brzonkala, would support allowing Congress to
wrest the entire field of criminal law from the states. However, the impact of
gender-motivated violence is distinct from the impact of crime in general. The
discrimination which is at the heart of the conduct prohibited by VAWA
provides a unique justification for federal intervention-a justification not
present if Congress were to pass a generic national criminal code.477
4 73 Id. at 853.
474 See supra Parts V.B.2 and V.B.3.
475 Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 889.
4 76 See id. at 838-39 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64).
47 7 The same argument applies to the trial court's claim that allowing Congress to
legislate against gender-motivated violence would necessarily allow Congress to do so with
respect to the economic effects of insomnia. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State
University, 935 F. Supp. 779, 792-93 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997),
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Additionally, the remedy chosen by Congress is tailored specifically to
respond to the discriminatory aspect of gender-motivated violence. Congress did
not attempt to pass a substantive national law of rape and domestic violence
under the purported authority of the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment Rather, it crafted a civil rights remedy.478
In fact, there is no inherent conflict between recognizing violence against
women as a federal civil rights violation and respecting the restrictions on
congressional power imposed by the Constitution. Although federal civil rights
law traditionally ignored violence against women, it did so not as a matter of
constitutionI necessity, but rather as a result of deeply ingrained intellectual and
cultural attitudes toward private and public spheres. Those same attitudes
animate the Brzonkala opinion, causing the court to exaggerate the private
aspects of gender-motivated violence and overlook the public ones.
VI. CONCLUSION
Violence against women has historically been considered "private" and
therefore beneath the notice of the law. Even after states began to acknowledge
the need for improved civil and criminal remedies for violence against women,
federal civil rights relief to remedy the discriminatory element of gender-
motivated violence remained lacking. When the Violence Against Women Act's
civil rights remedy was introduced in 1990, it was a direct challenge to the view
that violence against women belongs exclusively to the private sphere.
Consistent with the work of feminist scholars who have identified violence
against women as a form of sex discrimination, VAWA's civil rights provision
declares gender-motivated violence to be a public injury, deserving a public
remedy.
When VAWA was under consideration in Congress, it faced outspoken
opposition by the federal and state judiciaries, who perceived correctly that the
civil rights provision sought to bring about a change in traditional interpretations
of public and private. The resistance to VAWA was premised on the very
assumptions and stereotypes that the legislation sought to overcome: That all
cases involving women involve the family; that family matters should remain
vacated and reh'g en banc granted (Feb. 5, 1998), af'd, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. grantedsub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
478 By way of analogy, Congress has been found to be authorized to enact civil rights
legislation prohibiting discrimination by restaurants and hotels. See Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
However, it does not necessarily follow that Congress is thereby authorized to usurp local
control over other matters affecting restaurants and hotels, such as health codes, fire codes, and
zoning laws.
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private; that federal civil rights exist only to protect individuals from the state,
not from each other; and that cases involving the family have no place in federal
court. All of these arguments can be traced to the tendency to associate women
with the private sphere in all its forms-the sphere of the domestic, the sphere of
legal nonintervention, the sphere of civil society, and the sphere of state courts.
When VAWA was passed, it signaled a dramatic transformation in the law's
response to violence against women. For the first time, federal law has declared
crimes of violence motivated by gender to be a violation of the victim's civil
rights. But since VAWA was enacted, it has been under repeated attack and now
faces a Supreme Court challenge to its constitutionality. These constitutional
challenges reflect the classic dichotomies between the market and the family and
between the state and civil society-the very dichotomies that had ensured that
violence against women had remained for so long invisible in the law,
particularly in federal law. ThE argument that VAWA's civil rights remedy is
unconstitutional rests on the claim that gender-motivated violence is
insufficiently connected to the market to warrant congressional action under the
Commerce Clause and insufficiently connected to the state to warrant action
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The majority of courts to address these constitutional claims have properly
rejected them and have concluded that the civil rights remedy was a legitimate
exercise of Congress's legislative powers. However, in the case of Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, the judiciary's adherence to
traditional conceptions of privacy has resurfaced. In that case, the Fourth
Circuit's en banc opinion disregarded overwhelming evidence that gender-
motivated violence substantially affects interstate commerce and that such
violence is the subject of widespread discriminatory policies and practices by
state actors. The court did not credit this evidence of the public aspects of
gender-motivated violence but rather clung firmly to the long-accepted view that
violence against women is inherently and exclusively private.
The Brzonkala opinion portrays VAWA's civil rights remedy as
irreconcilable with a federal government of limited powers. If gender-motivated
violence were indeed purely private with respect to the distinctions between the
family and the market and between the state and civil society, this would be true,
for the Constitution embodies these distinctions in the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment, respectively. However, gender-motivated violence is
not purely private. Its public aspects include its massive effects on interstate
commerce; its role in preventing women from participating in commerce as
equals to men; its relationship to inadequate and discriminatory state laws and
legal systems; and its destructive effect on women's claims to social and political
equality. The public aspects of gender-motivated violence are more than
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sufficient to meet the requirements for congressional action under the Commerce
Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
And yet, it is important to acknowledge that in many respects, gender-
motivated violence is private when viewed through the lens of the classic public-
private dichotomies. It is usually committed within families or other personal
relationships, by private actors rather than state actors. Acknowledging the
private aspects of gender-motivated violence is crucial both to reflect women's
actual experience of violence and to understand the depth of the resistance to
including gender-motivated violence in federal civil rights law. It is precisely
because violence against women falls into the categories that have for so long
epitomized the private that VAWA was so hard to pass and now faces such a
serious challenge in the courts. Indeed, if gender-motivated violence were not
private to a significant degree, there would have been less need to pass a new
federal civil rights law to combat it. Many acts of gender-motivated violence in
the market sphere were already covered by Title VII, and many such acts in the
public sphere of the state would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution or existing civil rights laws.
An accurate view of gender-motivated violence requires the
acknowledgment that it has both private and public aspects. Although it was
historically conceived as purely private, violence against women in fact straddles
the categories of public and private as they have been traditionally defined. The
Violence Against Women Act's civil rights remedy recognizes the hybrid nature
of gender-motivated violence by creating a remedy against private individuals
that is anchored in Congress's constitutional powers to regulate interstate
commerce and to enforce the equality protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It now remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will adopt a conception of
public and private that is sufficiently nuanced to recognize the extent to which
gender-motivated violence spans the two categories.
Contrary to the claims of its detractors, upholding VAWA would not result
in eliminating the distinctions between public and private, between the market
and the family, between the state and civil society, and between federal and state
government Rather, it would simply recognize the extent to which gender-
motivated violence partakes of the public sphere, as envisioned by each of those
dichotomies, and therefore deserves public recognition and public response.
Judicial adherence to the familiar stereotype of violence against women as
quintessentially private has proven to be persistent, but it should not be allowed
to prevail. If the Violence Against Women Act's civil rights remedy is ultimately
found unconstitutional, the result will be to obscure the public significance of
gender-motivated violence and deny an effective legal remedy to its victims.
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